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ABSTRACT 
Officially, the Navy Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps' (NJROTC) 
mission is to educate high school students on the value of citizenship, public service, 
and personal responsibility. Since 1916, proponents and opponents have debated the 
value of the various Junior ROTC programs; however, there has been little empirical 
research that describes the extent to which these programs have actually benefited the 
services. As such, the purpose of this study was to examine the NJROTC program by 
analyzing the impact program participation has on Navy accessions and retentions 
from 2001 to 2005. 
The methodology used in this study was an exclusively quantitative analysis of 
pre-existing data from two large population databases: The Navy JROTC Unit 
Management System, which included career intent information on 39,745 NJROTC 
graduates from 2001 to 2005; the other database, from the Defense Management Data 
Center, provided demographic data on 211,076 Navy accessions from 2001 to 2005. 
Analysis of these databases revealed that NJROTC graduates' intent to join the 
military clearly benefits the Navy as a resource for recruiting; specifically, while 
there were small but positive differences in Naval accessions for most NJROTC 
participants, there were larger positive differences for women and African-American 
participants. In the final part of the analysis, a binary logistic regression model was 
created analyzing retention among several predictor variables; results indicated that 
the primary predictor variable, NJROTC accessions, were 45 percent more likely to 
be retained than non-NJROTC accessions after holding all other predictor variables 
constant. 
Taken together, the findings of this study have demonstrated that during the 
2001-2005 period, NJROTC operated as both a citizenship training program and a 
source of recruiting for the Navy. As such, there are a number of recommendations 
for further research; the first, and perhaps most immediate would be for the Navy to 
conduct a cost-benefit analysis to determine geographically where it makes sense to 
grant full participation to the 198 schools on the waiting list; the second, and perhaps 
most important, would involve survey research that targets NJROTC stakeholders to 
find out what the response would be if the Navy openly declared NJROTC as a 
recruiting tool. 
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The Junior Reserve Officers' Training Corps (JROTC), managed by the four 
U.S. military services—the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps—is the largest 
federally-funded high school character education program in the nation. JROTC s 
mission is to educate high school students as to the values of citizenship, public 
service, personal responsibility, and to teach a sense of self-worth (Junior Reserve 
Officer Training Corps, 2005). While few disagree with the mission of JROTC, there 
is a longstanding debate concerning the appropriateness of a publicly financed, 
militarily administered program in high schools (Berlowitz, 2001; Walls, 2003; 
Trasvina, J. 2007; Barbassa, 2008; Johnson, 2008). Proponents have noted JROTC's 
discernible impact on personal values and educational outcomes. Opponents, on the 
other hand, have cited two essential arguments: (a) high schools should not be used as 
military training facilities, and (b) the Department of Defense (DoD) military budget 
should not be used to fund what is perceived to be a luxury citizenship training 
program (Corbett & Coumbe, 2001). 
From a historical perspective, the National Defense Act of 1916 established 
the Army JROTC program as part of the World War I military expansion. The first 
JROTC program provided training for Army officers only (Hawkins, 1988). The 
ROTC Vitalization Act of 1964 added the Navy and Air Force JROTC programs and 
included funding for the expansion of the number of units from 254 to 1200 units 
(Reserve Officers' Training Vitalization Act of 1964). 
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JROTC continues to be a popular program with Congress. However, even with 
congressional support, JROTC is experiencing funding shortages for instructors, 
material, and equipment. Financial and accountability pressures make it likely that 
the Navy, as well as the other services, will have to justify funds allocated for their 
respective JROTC programs, as affirmed in the following quotation: 
If history is any guide, JROTC's bright future could quickly change. Many 
uniformed resource managers looking at a program's fiscal bottom line rather 
than its long-term but unquantifiable effects on civil-military relations and 
moral development of the Nation's youth will undoubtedly continue to view 
JROTC as an expensive luxury. (Corbett & Coumbe, 2001, p. 81) 
The Navy JROTC program is a cooperative effort funded in part by the military 
and in part by the local school district where the NJROTC Unit is located. The Naval 
Service Training Center (NSTC), located in Chicago, which manages the NJROTC 
program, claims, based on mostly anecdotal evidence, that an NJROTC Unit benefits 
the student as well as the community. For example, NSTC asserts that cadets gain 
personal satisfaction and improve their self-esteem by belonging to the NJROTC 
team. It should be noted that the NJROTC offers schools the opportunity to 
incorporate basic elements of citizenship and leadership into the curriculum. The 
NJROTC further states that these units support the school with community service 
projects as well as military ceremonial functions. 
Although NSTC does not advocate NJROTC as a military recruiting program, 
NJROTC cadets do get special consideration for college ROTC scholarships and 
appointments to the U.S. Naval Academy and are entitled to advanced promotion in 
the military upon enlistment (Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS], 
1999). While the NJROTC mission statement does not specifically identify accession 
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incentives as a form of Navy recruiting some consider these incentives as a form of 
Navy recruiting. 
The NJROTC budget for fiscal year 2008 was $62 million, with the hosting 
schools' share coupled with instructors' retirement pay, $50 and $100 million 
respectively. Thus, according to NJROTC staff in Pensacola, FL, the total anticipated 
cost for the over 92,685 cadets enrolled in 624 NJROTC units was $212 million 
(Teresa Casey, NJROTC Headquarters Staff, personal communication, February 27, 
2009). 
Based on a review of the JROTC literature, the military service JROTC 
programs appear to produce positive social benefits, such as Cadet's feeling included 
in a group, when JROTC participants are compared to their non-JROTC peers. 
Further, the majority of the research supports the claim of JROTC's positive social 
benefits using survey instruments as the primary research method (Bailey, Hodak, 
Sheppard, & Hassen, 1992; Demoulin & Ritter, 2000; Flowers, 1999; Kilted, Solver, 
& Ritter, 1999; Kolstad & Ritter, 2000; Reiger & Demoulin, 2000; Roberts, 1991; 
Schmidt, 2001, 2003a, b; Walls, 2003). Community stakeholders in the area in which 
the JROTC unit resides also tend to hold positive perceptions of JROTC instructors 
(Logan, 2000; Marks, 2004; Perusse, 1997). Although the literature cites JROTC in a 
good light, there have been recent initiatives by those who oppose JROTC to 
pressure school boards to close down units, initiatives such as citing equal 
opportunity concerns for homosexuals and women, as well as removing physical 
education credit and eliminating air rifle competitions (Cdr. Vizcarra, personal 
communication, February 27, 2009; Barbassa, 2008). 
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Additionally, anecdotal and limited empirical evidence suggest that JROTC 
cadets have a greater propensity to join the military than do their non-JROTC peers 
(Days & Ang, 2004; Laurence & Estrada, 2003). Curiously, increased military 
accessions are seldom voiced as a goal by the respective service JROTC program 
representatives, primarily for the reason that JROTC units may not be welcomed in 
high schools if the program is identified as a military recruiting program (Days & 
Ang, 2003). 
Four studies, all sponsored by the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), Monterey, 
CA, provide quantifiable evidence on the JROTC program as it relates to recruiting 
and retaining military personnel. These studies provided an essential foundation to 
this research, which focuses on the Navy JROTC program. Pertinent findings from 
these studies are described in the "Review of the Literature" in Chapter 2. The first 
study noted there (Days & Ang, 2004), is an empirical examination of the impact of 
JROTC participation on enlistment, retention, and attrition. The researchers analyzed 
data from the 1980 "High School and Beyond" (HS&B) survey database and the 
Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) enlisted personnel cohort files (1980 to 
2000). The second study by Laurence and Estrada (2003) also used DMDC data and 
provides a comprehensive review of the curriculum, budgeting issues, and 
recruitment. In the third NPS-sponsored study, Walls (2003) compared JROTC with 
other successful youth programs, such as Boys and Girls Clubs, Scouts, YMCA, 
YWCA, 4-H, Camp Fire, religious youth programs, sports programs, and others. 
Walls concluded his study with an analysis using DMDC data on military recruits 
who participated in JROTC. The fourth (Hentz & Packwood, 2007) investigated 
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whether JROTC participation significantly impacts first-term attrition, promotion, 
reenlistment, time to attrition, and time to promotion. This study analyzed DMDC 
data from 1994-2000. The results of the various studies indicated that JROTC had a 
statistically positive association with promotion, reenlistment and time to attrition. 
While each of the NPS studies provided information regarding the potential effect of 
JROTC participation on military enlistment and retention, these studies were focused 
on larger JROTC programmatic issues and incorporated only limited empirical 
evidence on the Navy JROTC program. 
An examination of the NJROTC impact on recruiting and retention is of interest 
to Navy policymakers who have budget responsibility over NJROTC, recruitment, 
and administrative discharge costs; however, there is limited information on the 
impact NJROTC has on Navy recruiting. One of the reasons is that studies to date 
have focused on all the service programs. Secondly, emphasizing NJROTC as a 
recruiting tool in high schools can be problematic. Given that there are stakeholders 
who oppose the Navy on high school campuses for any reason, the Navy chooses to 
highlight the character education aspects of teaching citizenship and leadership, 
which, as previously reported, seems to have a positive social benefit. However, 
given the mandate for Navy program managers to provide measures of effectiveness 
of their program, quantifying the net benefits and costs of NJROTC participation will 
give Navy policymakers additional data to make a more informed decision with 
respect to the cost effectiveness of the NJROTC program. 
If it can be shown with quantifiable data that NJROTC participants join and are 
retained in the Navy at a higher rate than non-NJROTC participants, then it may be 
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assumed that there is an incentive to use NJROTC as a source of recruitment. 
Combining this premise with the fact that it costs an average of $11,000 to recruit an 
enlisted person and less than $5,000 to train an NJROTC cadet, one could make a 
cost saving argument to use NJROTC as a pipeline-training program (Laurence & 
Estrada, 2003). 
In addition, in 2005 and 2008, two Chiefs of Naval Operations (CNO) stated in 
the Navy's diversity policy that they wanted to improve the representation of the 
Navy with respect to diversity (Admiral Michael Mullen, personal communication, 
September 22, 2005; Admiral Gary Roughhead, personal communication, March 3, 
2008). One notable Navy diversity statistic is that fewer than 7.4 percent of the Navy 
officer corps is Black compared to 13 percent in the general population. Black 
NJROTC representation for the past 10 years has been about 34 percent. This in itself 
adds further substantiation to explore NJROTC as a pipeline-recruiting tool for 
officers representing diverse backgrounds. If empirical evidence were available that 
showed NJROTC positively influences their cadets to pursue a career and remain in 
the Navy, then program managers could use this supportive recruiting and retention 
evidence for the continued funding of the program. This evidence could also support 
other cost-saving endeavors, such as using NJROTC as a pipeline-training program to 
decrease time-to-train requirements or as a relatively cheaper recruiting tool. 
Statement of the Problem 
While current literature shows the potential positive impact of JROTC 
participation on values and educational performance, there is a paucity of evidence as 
to the benefit to the military relative to JROTC's programmatic costs. Furthermore, 
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there is limited information on JROTC relative recruiting and retention in all services 
including with little or no empirical evidence on the Navy JROTC program. The 
focus of this study is the Navy's JROTC program. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study was to determine whether NJROTC participation has 
an influence on Navy accessions and retentions. If, as some argue, NJROTC 
participation positively influences Navy accessions and retentions, then policymakers 
could be made aware of the costs and benefits of NJROTC relative to other Navy 
recruiting programs. On the other hand, if NJROTC participation does not 
significantly influence Navy accessions and retentions, then the arguments of those 
seeking to reduce or eliminate NJROTC expenditures gain credence. By providing 
empirical evidence of NJROTC's effect on Navy accessions and retentions, the 
ongoing debate in the literature will be clarified. 
Methodology 
The data for the intentions of graduating NJROTC students were obtained from 
the Naval Service Training Command (NSTC) Navy JROTC Unit Management 
System (JUMS). The data for Navy enlisted personnel were obtained from the 
Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC). Both data sources offer demographic data 
supporting the purpose of this study, which was to assess the impact NJROTC has on 
Navy accessions and retentions. NJROTC graduates were the study's primary 
subjects of consideration. The impact to the study participants was virtually non-
existent given the fact the researcher cannot identify a case record with a given 
NJROTC cadet in the JUMS data or a given Navy accessions in the DMDC data. 
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The methodology for this study was a quantitative analysis of pre-existing data. 
Descriptive and inferential statistical analysis techniques, including logistic 
regression analysis, were employed to provide empirical evidence for the following 
research questions and hypotheses: 
Research Question 1: What are the NJROTC graduates' post-high school 
career intentions by race, gender, location, and socioeconomic status? 
Research Question 2: Are there significant differences between NJROTC 
participants and non-NJROTC participants for Navy enlisted accessions (DMDC 
data) by race, gender, Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) score, location, and 
socioeconomic status? This research question to leads to: 
Hypothesis 1; Among Navy enlisted accessions, there is no significant 
difference between those who participated in NJROTC and non-NJROTC students. 
Research Question 3: Are there significant differences between NJROTC 
participants and non-NJROTC participants for Navy enlisted retention by race, 
gender, AFQT score, location, and socioeconomic status? This research question 
leads to: 
Hypothesis 2: Among Navy enlisted personnel who are retained in the Navy, 
there is no significant difference between those who participated in NJROTC and 
non-NJROTC students. This research question leads to: 
Research Question 4: Is there a significant difference between NJROTC 
graduate cadets' intent to enlist in the Navy and their actual behavior by race, gender, 
and location? This research question leads to: 
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Hypothesis 3: There is no difference between the JUMS database on NJROTC 
cadet graduates' intent to enlist and those who actually enlist in the Navy. 
Significance of the Study 
The increasing significance of this study addresses the fact that since September 
11, 2001, the day of the infamous terrorist attacks against the U.S., the Navy has 
directed all Navy program managers to justify their programs based on priorities to 
support the Global War on Terror (GWOT). Funding a citizenship-training program 
did not make the list of priorities; on the other hand, recruiting a quality force 
representing the diversity of America did make the list (U.S. Department of the Navy, 
2004). Consequently, if it can be shown that NJROTC cadets, join and remain in the 
Navy at a higher rate than non-NJROTC students join and remain, then there is 
evidence to consider the NJROTC as a Navy pipeline-recruiting or training program. 
Added evidence would also be gained if it can be shown as a source for the 
recruitment of minorities to meet Navy diversity goals. 
Definitions of Key Terms 
The following are definitions of specific terms used in this study: 
Accessions: These are recruits who enter the Navy as enlisted personnel or 
students who are selected for a Navy officer entry programs. 
Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT): AFQT scores are a measure of 
recruits' qualification for potential military services. These scores are divided 
into five categories (I, II, IIIA, IIIB, IV, and V), with Category I being the 
highest. The categories are sub-divided into percentiles based on a potential 
recruits' scores on the test (Cat I - 93-99%; CAT II - 65-92%; CAT IIIA -
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50-64%; CAT IIIB - 31-49%; CAT IV 10-30%; and CAT V - 1-9%). In FY 
2004, over 70% of the Navy enlisted accessions' came from Categories I-IIIA, 
which represent recruits with scores above the 50th percentile. 
Attrition: Enlisted personnel who fail to complete their first term of enlistment. 
For this study, recruits who leave the Navy within the first three years of their 
enlistment provided the metric for attrition. Those who remain in the Navy for 
those three years were considered retained. 
Cadet: A student enrolled in any of the four service JROTC programs. 
First-Term Enlistment: The first term of enlistment for the Navy is based on 
the time a recruit is obligated to serve to complete the enlistment contract. 
This is normally 36 months. 
Defense Management Data Center (DMDC): DMDC provides the military a 
variety of military demographic data. The data of concern for this study were 
demographic data on Navy accessions from 2001 to 2005. 
Gender: The military is a male-dominated organization based on an 85 percent 
male to female ratio. There are four primary reasons for this: (1) women have 
a lower inclination to enlist; (2) current combat policies exclude women; (3) 
Growth must come from within. Lateral entries, entries from outside the 
military, have no significant impact; and (4) women leave the service at a 
higher rate than do men. 
Global War on Terror (GWOT): The September 11, 2001, attacks on the World 
Trade Center and the Pentagon have thrust the U.S. into a new age of 
instability in an effort to fight terrorists around the world. 
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Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps (JROTC): A high school military-
supported citizenship training program that is represented by the following 
four services: Army - AJROTC; Navy - NJROTC; Air Force - AFJROTC; 
and Marine Corps - MJROTC. The college program is named the ROTC 
program. 
JROTC Unit Management System (JUMS): The JUMS database provides 
NJROTC leaders with up-to-date information on student enrollment 
demographics and financial accounting of the unit expenses. It is also used to 
record NJROTC career intent upon graduation from high school. 
Officer Candidate School (OCS): Officer Candidate School is a 90-day training 
program designed to train cadets to become Navy officers. 
Location: Location measures, such as the NJROTC 11 Geographic Areas and 
five U.S. regions, were controlled statistically to determine whether there 
were any significant demographic differences based on geographic location. 
Race: Race is represented by the following categories: White, Black, Asian, 
Hispanic, and Other, and were analyzed for the JROTC Unit Management 
System (JUMS) data. Hispanics were not tracked consistently for the DMDC 
data from 2001 through 2005. Hispanics represent 13 percent of the U.S. 
population. However, from 2003 to 2005, the DMDC Hispanic Race data 
appear to be integrated with Blacks, Mexican-American, and American 
Indian, resulting in a small percentage reporting as Hispanics. Thus, the 
DMDC race categories are White, Black, Asian, and Other, with Hispanics 
and other low percentage race respondents reported in the Other category of 
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DMDC race data. The issue of under reported numbers of Hispanics has also 
raised questions with the 2010 Census (Washington, 2009). 
Retention: Navy enlisted personnel who remain in the Navy for three years 
after the date of enlistment. Three years were used based on the minimum 
enlistment timeframe. 
Return on Investment (ROI): Return on investment in the business sector is a 
calculation used to determine whether a proposed investment is wise and how 
well it will repay the investor. It is calculated as the ratio of the amount 
gained (taken as positive) or lost (taken as negative) relative to the base. For 
this study, support or contraindication for the Navy's ROI were derived from 
the proposed differential research with respect to Navy accessions and 
retentions of NJROTC graduates. 
Socioeconomic Status: Socioeconomic status is based on the location of the 
recruit's residence upon enlistment. The four categories of socioeconomic 
status were derived from the 2000 Census, based on median household 
income and five-numbered Zip code: Low Income - 0 up to $43,601; Medium 
Low Income - $43,601 up to $53,026; Medium High Income - $53,026 up to 
$66,082; and High Income - $66,082 and greater (adjusted for inflation to 




REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
The purpose of this study was to determine whether NJROTC participation was 
an influence on Navy accessions and retentions. If, as some argue, NJROTC 
participation positively influences Navy accessions and retentions, then policymakers 
should be aware of the costs and benefits of NJROTC relative to other Navy 
recruiting programs. On the other hand, if NJROTC participation does not 
significantly influence Navy accessions and retentions, then the arguments of those 
seeking to reduce or eliminate NJROTC expenditures gain credence. By providing 
empirical evidence of NJROTC's effect on Navy accessions and retentions, the 
ongoing debate in the literature will be clarified by the provision of specific cost and 
benefit information for NJROTC. 
To convey an understanding of the Navy's JROTC program, the following 
literature review is presented in six sections. The first section provides details on the 
legislative history of the Navy's JROTC program. The second section offers 
information on the NJROTC's organizational processes, structure, and curriculum. 
The third section gives specifics on the cost of the NJROTC program to the naval 
service and local school districts. The fourth section synthesizes the related research 
on the efficacy of the NJROTC program. The fifth section offers information on the 
Navy Recruiting Command (NRC). Although recruiting is not a stated goal of the 
NJROTC program, an understanding of the Navy recruiting processes is necessary to 
support a rationale for using NJROTC as a Navy recruit pipeline-training program. 
The final section summarizes the review of this literature chapter. 
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Legislative History ofNJROTC 
The literature describes three main legislative events in authorizing the funding 
to establish and expand the JROTC program: (a) the National Defense Act of 1916, 
(b) the ROTC Vitalization Act of 1964, and (c) the National Defense Act of 1993. 
The National Defense Act of 1916 established the Army JROTC program 
because of World War I military expansion and the need to have an available source 
of future military officers. The first JROTC program provided training for Army 
officers only (Hawkins, 1988). The 1916 Act's course of instruction delineated a 
three-hour-per-week syllabus to be accomplished over a three-year period; upon 
completion, the secondary student received a certificate of eligibility for a reserve 
Army commission when the applicant reached the age of 21. With respect to the 
JROTC, the provision of the Act authorized the loan of military equipment and the 
assignment of active or retired Army personnel. High schools needed to maintain a 
minimum enrollment of 100 students over 14 years of age in the program (National 
Defense Act of 1916). 
The second major legislative initiative, the ROTC Vitalization Act of 1964, 
added the Navy and Air Force JROTC programs and included funding for the 
expansion of the number of units from 254 to 1200 units (Reserve Officers' Training 
Vitalization Act of 1964). Notably, this legislation resulted from a backlash by 
parents, teachers, and members of Congress to then Secretary of State Robert S. 
McNamara's initial proposal to cut military funding for the JROTC program 
(Hawkins, 1988). Other significant changes to the program following this legislation 
consisted of the addition of the Marine JROTC program and the inclusion of female 
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cadets in the 1970s. Much of the research literature focuses on Army JROTC based 
on its 50-year advantage over the other services as a JROTC organization. 
The 1992 Los Angeles riots influenced President George H. W. Bush and then 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Colin Powell, to increase the number of 
JROTC units, especially in inner city areas, in an effort to provide positive role 
models for disadvantaged American youth. General Powell stated, "Inner city kids, 
many from broken homes, found stability and role models from JROTC" (Powell, 
1995, p. 541). Justification for increased funding included an expectation of 
increased high school completion rates, reduced drug use, raised self-esteem, and 
keeping the kids on the "right track" (Days & Ang, 2004). The National Defense 
Authorization Act of 1993 authorized funding for the expansion of the existing 1600 
units to 3500 units, with the focus of placing these new units in under-represented 
areas, such as the northern plains, northeast and New England, and in inner cities 
(Laurence & Estrada, 2003). 
In recent years, JROTC has continued to be a popular program with Congress. 
However, even with congressional support, JROTC continues to experience funding 
shortages for instructors, material, and equipment. Further, the No Child Left Behind 
Act of 2001 mandated accountability measures, such as requiring JROTC instructors 
to have single- and multiple-subject teaching certificates. Financial constraints and 
accountability pressures make it likely that JROTC programs will have to justify 
funding to continue the program at the present cost to the military. The following 
statement amplifies pressure for the military to justify their budgets: 
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If history is any guide, JROTC's bright future could quickly change. Many 
uniformed resource managers looking at a program's fiscal bottom line rather 
than its long-term but unquantifiable effects on civil-military relations and 
moral development of the Nation's youth will undoubtedly continue to view 
JROTC as an expensive luxury. (Corbett & Coumbe, 2001, p. 81) 
The then Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Jay Johnson, testified before 
Congress that "even if the number is only 30 percent [JROTC cadets joining the 
military], that is a good number. But think about what we get out of the other 70 
percent. They have exposure to the military" (National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2001). It can be inferred from this statement by the CNO that the 
general U.S. population would benefit from having an understanding of the purpose 
of the military. 
Military recruiters have been given equal access to high school students, as is 
the case with other employers and college recruiters (No Child Left Behind Act of 
2001). Military recruiters now have access to student phone numbers and addresses 
and the freedom to recruit at high school campuses. As a result, there is increased 
controversy over whether the military should be allowed to recruit on high school 
campuses. Some in JROTC leadership have voiced their concerns on JROTC 
recruiting in that it could open Pandora's Box, providing undeniable evidence to 
those who have sentiments that JROTC is being used as a recruiting instrument rather 
than a citizenship and leadership education program. 
The NJROTC Organization and Curriculum 
Under guidance provided by the Department of Defense and the Secretary of 
the Navy, the Naval Service Training Command (NSTC) is responsible for 
administering the NJROTC program. NSTC is located in Chicago; however, the 
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department responsible for the NJROTC program is located in Pensacola, Florida. 
Currently, there is a staff of 22 Area Managers and eight at headquarters, led by the 
director of the program, Dr. J. D. Smith. All staff members are civil service or 
government contractors (Dr. J.D. Smith, personal communication, January 13, 2009). 
The administrative mission of the NSTC NJROTC staff is to direct and support 
the operations and administration of the NJROTC units through a network of 11 
NJROTC area managers, which are numbered Area 3 through 13 (see Figure 1). 
Each area manager, usually a retired senior naval officer, and an administrative 
assistant are both government contractors. The NSTC NJROTC staff also provides 
oversight for evaluating the quality of the program and its budget (Lavin, n.d.). Area 
managers are geographically distributed throughout the United States. Their purpose 
is to provide the quality control link from the NJROTC program office in Pensacola 
to the present 624 NJROTC units. The area managers interface with the NJROTC 
Unit instructors to ensure that the Navy provides the host units proper support. 
Further, these 11 area managers address any issues from the host school or 
community in which the NJROTC Unit resides. In the summer, the area managers 
direct or participate in the summer training programs for instructors and summer 
academies for cadets. The area manager is also involved in unit assessment by 
ensuring each unit completes its annual graduate data report via the Navy JROTC 
Unit Management system. Data from 2001 to 2005 were used in this research. Each 
year, the area manager ensures that a qualified examiner, normally the area manager 
or a designated military representative, inspects all the units. Figure 1 depicts the 11 
NJROTC geographical areas in which the 624 NJROTC units reside. 
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Figure 1. The 11 NJROTC Geographic Areas 
From Naval Junior Officer's Training Corps program, by U. S. Department of the 
Navy, 2009, retrieved February 27, 2009, from https://www.njrotc.navy.mil/. As 
noted earlier there is no Area 1 or 2. Adapted with permission of the author. 
There are over 1,300 NJROTC instructors at 624 units. These instructors, who 
are retired officers or enlisted personnel from the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast 
Guard, teach the NJROTC program at accredited high schools. Each school 
participating in NJROTC has one lead instructor, called the Senior Naval Science 
Instructor (SNSI), a retired commissioned officers of the rank W2 (Navy or USMC 
Warrant Officer) through 06 (Navy Captain or USMC Colonel). Assisting the SNSI 
are retired enlisted personnel from the rank of E6 (Petty Officer First Class or Staff 
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Sergeant) through E9 (Master Chief or Master Gunnery Sergeant) who are called 
Naval Science Instructors (NSI). Depending on the number of cadets, there will be 
one or more NSIs. Though there is a separate USMC JROTC program, Marine Corps 
officers and enlisted personnel can fill the Navy's JROTC SNSI or NSI positions. 
The NSTC certifies instructors through a semi-annual board process. Instructors also 
have to meet certain physical fitness and weight standards. Final hiring criteria and 
specific qualification requirements remain with the employing school district. 
Until recently, the minimum education requirement for a SNSI was a bachelor's 
degree and a high school diploma or its equivalent for the NSI. However, recent 
pressures of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 have forced local school districts 
and the Navy to address the issue of single- and multiple-subject teaching credentials 
for NJROTC teachers (No Child Left Behind Act of 2001). This added instructor 
qualification presently varies state by state but is forecasted to become a permanent 
requirement, causing an added burden to the hiring of the enlisted NSIs who normally 
do not have a bachelor's degree. For the time being, most school districts are giving 
SNSIs and NSIs a five-year grace period to complete their certification and 
educational requirements (Cdr. K. Lyles, personal communication, October 14, 
2005). 
The NJROTC instructor salary is roughly equal to the pay the military member 
received when on active duty. The host school, the naval service, and the instructor 
(based on his/her retirement pay) share the cost to meet the instructor's equivalent 
active duty pay (U.S. Department of the Navy, 2005). The minimum instructor pay is 
based on the following formula: Base Pay (based on rank at retirement) plus Basic 
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Allowance for Housing (BAH) for the area in which the unit is located, plus Basic 
Allowance for Subsistence (BAS), plus clothing allowance (enlisted only) plus Cost 
of Living Adjustments (COLA), minus Gross Retirement, which equals minimum 
instructor pay (MIP). MIP is divided equally between the Navy and the host school 
district. As an example, if a Commander/05 pay grade received $100,000 on active 
duty, and his retirement pay was $50,000, the respective JROTC service and school 
system would split the remaining cost of $50,000 and incur a cost of $25,000 each 
(U.S. Department of the Navy, 2005). Normally, $25,000 per year is below the 
average pay for a beginning teacher, especially given that this NJROTC teacher has 
over 20 years of military experience. Further, some of the SNSIs and NSIs teach 
after-school sports programs, offering the school district an added leadership resource 
for teaching team sports. 
To be a host NJROTC Unit school, the school must be a fully-accredited 
secondary education institution and must complete an application with the Naval 
Service Training Command (NSTC). The main provisions of the application are to 
(a) provide a three-year or four-year course of instruction in naval science; (b) 
maintain unit enrollment of 100 in the program, or 10 percent of the student 
population of the high school; (c) offer no less than one full credit toward graduation 
for each academic year of NJROTC completion; and (d) provide classroom space, 
storage space, instructor office space, an assembly area, a drill field, and clerical 
assistance (U.S. Department of the Navy, 2005). As of February 2009, there were 
198 schools on the Navy JROTC waiting list. 
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A student must be enrolled in grades 9 through 12 at the school where the unit 
resides to become an NJROTC cadet. Cadets must meet the school's standards for 
participation in the school's physical education program. Other criteria are 
acceptable standards of academic achievement, standards of conduct, and personal 
grooming standards mandated by the SNSI and school. Essential to the grooming 
standards is that NJROTC cadet appearance is not to reflect disgrace on the naval 
service. Special NJROTC students who do not meet the qualification requirements 
may be enrolled as NJROTC cadets with approval of the principal and the SNSI. Any 
additional support to provide instruction to special education students must be 
provided by the host school (U.S. Department of the Navy, 1996). 
As of 2004, NJROTC units numbered 624 and instructed 86,069 cadets—41 
percent female and 59 percent male. The minority participation is 64 percent: 34 
percent Black-American, 22 percent Hispanic, four percent Asian-American/Pacific 
Islander, 1 percent Native American/Alaskan Native, and three percent other. The 
Naval Service Training Command states that more than 60 percent of the NJROTC 
graduating cadets continue to higher education, with 40 percent entering military 
service. These minority percentages, which are higher than the nationwide average, 
are an indicator of the program's success in attracting cadets from diverse and 
disadvantaged backgrounds (U.S. Department of the Navy, 2005). Since the active 
duty Navy has had difficulties meeting diversification goals (Admiral Michael 
Mullen, Chief of Naval Operations, personal communication, September 22, 2005), 
NJROTC should be an attractive recruiting source based on its diverse population of 
cadets. 
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The NSTC claims, based on mostly anecdotal evidence, that an NJROTC Unit 
benefits the student as well as the community (U.S. Department of the Navy, 2005). 
Cadets gain personal satisfaction from belonging to the NJROTC team. The 
NJROTC offers a school the opportunity to incorporate basic elements of citizenship 
and leadership into the curriculum. The units support the school with community 
service projects, as well as ceremonial functions using color guard and drill teams. 
NJROTC cadets also get special consideration for college ROTC scholarships and 
appointments to the U.S. Naval Academy and are entitled to advanced promotion in 
the military upon enlistment (CSIS, 1999). These incentives appear to be recruiting 
incentives, although Navy JROTC leaders state that it is an unintended favorable 
consequence to the Navy and insist that the NJROTC program is offered to train high 
school students in citizenship and leadership (Cdr. Mark Watson, personal 
communication, June 29, 2006). 
The NJROTC curriculum covers eight major academic areas over a period of 
four years. The course of instruction is designed to complete two areas of instruction 
for each year (Lavin, n.d., pp. 1-6): 
1. Year One: Cadet Field Manual and Introduction to the NJROTC Course 
2. Year Two: Maritime History and Nautical Sciences 
3. Year Three: Naval Knowledge and Naval Skills 
4. Year Four: Leadership Theory and Leadership Laboratory 
The program integrates classroom time, group exercises, physical fitness, and 
field trips to provide a balance of different naval service learning activities. The 
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majority of NJROTC units also sponsor annual pass in review, drill teams, color 
guards, physical skill tests, and marksmanship contests. 
The NJROTC goals of citizenship and leadership training are emphasized 
throughout the four years of cadet instruction. With respect to citizenship training, 
the fundamental requirements for democratic citizenship and what it means to be a 
good citizen are taught in Unit III - Citizenship and IV - Foundations of Our 
Government in the Introduction of the NJROTC Course during the second semester 
of the cadet's freshman year. The classroom leadership training occurs in Unit II -
Leadership, occurring during the same course. Also, during the senior year, the two 
courses entitled Leadership Theory and Leadership Lab specifically focuses on 
teaching the basic principles of leadership, ethics, and morals. They also provide 
leadership case studies, plus a practical portion providing these senior cadets the 
opportunity to serve in positions of authority in their NJROTC Unit. 
When comparing the NJROTC curriculum with Navy entrance training 
curricula for officers and enlisted personnel, there are many similarities—especially 
in the naval history and leadership training classes. This leads to the assumption that 
there has been some foresight in using the NJROTC as a Navy accessions program. It 
further lends credence to the idea of using NJROTC as a pipeline-training program 
for high school students who intend to join the Navy after they graduate from high 
school. This will be considered in further detail throughout this dissertation. 
NJROTC Cost 
In the examination of the literature, it was discovered that an accurate 
accounting of the total cost of the program was lacking. This is mainly because the 
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Navy and the host school report their budgets separately. Moreover, NJROTC cost 
totals generally do not include indirect costs to the host school for field trips, school 
space, school insurance, janitorial service, and lighting, all of which would be 
difficult to quantify for 624 units. 
The total cost to the Navy from fiscal year 2000 to 2007 has risen from $37 to 
$58 Million supporting increases from 490 to 624 units and 69,749 to 92,685 cadets, 
respectively. The average cost per cadet over the same period was between $531 
(2000) and $627 (2008) in Table 1. 
Table 1 
NAVY JUNIOR RESERVE OFFICERS TRAINING CORPS BUDGET 
FY2000 FY2001 FY2002 FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006 FY2007 
O&M Resources (000) 1/ 25,913 28,183 32,283 37,394 39,798 39,743 42,875 44,595 
Uniforms & Subsistence (RPA) (000) 11,089 13,945 12,207 13,937 12,388 12,763 13,094 13,476 
Service Totals: (000) $37,002 42,128 44,490 51,331 52,186 52,506 55,969 58,071 
Avg. Cadet Enrollments 69,749 74,513 77,958 84,613 86,069 88,894 90,425 92,685 
Investment per Cadet 531 565 571 607 606 591 619 627 
Units (World-wide) 490 562 582 623 624 624 624 624 
1/ O&M funding for instructor salaries (approx. 85%), textbooks, travel, educational materials, and 
miscellaneous expenses. 
Source, FY2006 President's Budget 
For FY 2008, not listed in Table 1, the Navy JROTC $62 million budget as 
reported from the NJROTC headquarters staff was derived from two funding lines: 
Operational and Maintenance Navy (OMN) and Reserve Program Navy (RPN). The 
OMN budget for NJROTC, $48 million, provided funding for instructor salaries, 
textbooks, travel, and educational materials. The RPN budget for NJROTC, $14 
million, provided funding for uniform items. The school districts paid an estimated 
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$50 million in instructor pay (not included are benefits, FICA, and indirect costs for 
schools to provide working spaces on school grounds). Coupling instructor retirement 
pay, an estimated $100 million, brings the total cost of NJROTC to $212 million. 
(Teresa Casey, NJROTC Headquarters Staff, personal communication, 27 February 
2009). 
Since 2000, the NJROTC program has had a 27 percent increase in units. 
Although there is support for continued expansion of the Navy program, funding of 
the NJROTC program has not met with commensurate support from certain elements 
in the Navy itself. The main reason is that some believe NJROTC is a luxury item 
and that there are military items of greater importance to fund, especially during the 
present Global War on Terrorism (Corbett & Coumbe, 2001). 
If empirical evidence were obtained that NJROTC positively influences 
NJROTC cadets to pursue a career and remain in the Navy, then program managers 
can give added evidence for the continued funding of the program. As stated 
previously, this evidence could also support other cost-saving endeavors, such as 
using NJROTC as a pipeline-training program to decrease time to train for Navy 
officers and enlisted personnel or using NJROTC as a relatively cheaper recruiting 
tool. 
NJROTC Related Research 
Most of the documentation on the NJROTC program is derived from 
government documents. Limited peer-reviewed literature exists focusing specifically 
on the Navy, which is why the majority of the related research is derived from studies 
on the other service JROTC programs. This section is divided into two parts. The 
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first part is a synthesis of peer-reviewed literature on stakeholder perceptions of the 
JROTC program and JROTC outcome evaluation studies. To counter the abundance 
of JROTC-based research supporting the program, information is included from the 
opponents of JROTC. The second part examines JROTC's influence on military 
accession, retention, and attrition. 
Studies on the Perceptions and Outcomes of JROTC 
The JROTC research can be categorized according to two general areas: (a) 
studies that assess perceptions about the program and (b) assessments on achieving 
the curriculum objectives. Surveys were the primary research instruments used to 
obtain the data. The questions were typically formed to collect factual and attitudinal 
data. Following an analysis of the data, the authors used descriptive and inferential 
statistics to report the findings. 
Two examples of typical scholarly studies on perception of the JROTC program 
were a school counselor's perception of JROTC (Perruse, 1997) and the principal's 
attitude about JROTC instructors (Logan, 2000). Other stakeholder study participants 
were cadets, parents, and community members. These studies, and others (Hicks, 
2000; Marks, 2004; Morris, 2003), reported positive stakeholder perceptions of 
JROTC. They also provided encouraging anecdotal claims by the participants. Of 
note, these researchers tended to support the JROTC program, which could create the 
impression of bias in the findings, especially with respect to the anecdotal claims. 
The largest study of NJROTC perception, Benefits Analysis of the Naval Junior 
Reserve Officers Training Corps, was conducted by the Navy in 1992 (Bailey, et al., 
1992). This study, though 14 years old, was the last large NJROTC research effort 
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conducted by the Navy. The purpose of the study was to conduct an evaluation of the 
NJROTC for the Navy and the secondary school system. Survey instruments were 
developed targeting the perceptions of the NJROTC instructors, school 
administrators, members of the community, and students. A representative sample of 
38 units out of the population of 228 units was selected to participate in the study, 
with 5,521 cadets participating, which at that time were 18.78 percent of the total 
NJROTC cadet population. The findings from this study reported the overall 
perceptions of the NJROTC program as providing positive benefits to the students 
and community. Following this study, the Navy began collecting annual data on 
NJROTC cadet postgraduate intentions, which as stated previously, are examined in 
this study. 
Another large sample perception study of JROTC units was sponsored by the 
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS, 1999). The intention of the 
CSIS study, JROTC: Contributions to America's Communities, was to conduct 
JROTC field research in medium-sized urban environments. The investigators 
gathered a variety of field research data from three school systems: (a) Chicago, (b) 
Washington, D.C., and (c) El Paso. These cities represented the type of urban 
environment targeted for JROTC expansion in the 1990s in order to assist 
disadvantaged urban youth. The findings of the study, which included NJROTC 
units, claimed that JROTC is beneficial to communities and should be expanded with 
the necessary resources (CSIS, 1999). The benefit of the CSIS report was the 
background information provided about the four JROTC programs. However, as in 
most JROTC research, the study was descriptive in nature with primarily anecdotal 
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evidence to support its findings. Further, the study lacked balance when compared 
with the reported CSIS research on the three cities. The findings of the Chicago 
research were far more in depth than the findings for Washington, D.C., and El Paso. 
In addition, this study did not identify which service JROTC units were selected for 
the field research. Overall, the CSIS study is problematic for those seeking 
quantitative evidence on the benefit of JROTC. Also, the report does not offer 
findings that address specific service JROTC program. 
The JROTC academic outcome-related studies focused on measuring the 
program's effect on teaching citizenship and leadership (Bulach, 2002; Hawkins, 
1988; Roberts, 1991). One such series of studies sought to compare JROTC and non-
JROTC students based on two psychometric tests designed to measure citizenship. 
The two test measures, the DEMO and the SELF test, attempted to determine the 
participants' level of "democratic maturity" and "cognitive dissonance" (Demoulin & 
Ritter, 2000, p. 410). The DEMO test, designed to measure democratic maturity, was 
based on John Dewey's definition of democracy: "The interdependence of 
independent individuals" (Demoulin & Ritter, 2000, p. 410). The test itself was 
designed to measure factors that are needed to live successfully in a democracy. The 
SELF test measures cognitive dissonance: "Cognitive dissonance is described as a 
hurt caused by personal needs not being gratified" (Demoulin & Ritter, 2000, p. 410). 
The questionnaires that were included in the DEMO and SELF tests were 
administered to Army and Air Force JROTC cadets and to other organized groups— 
college students, high school students, and other groups (Cassel & Ritter, 1999; 
Cassel & Standifer; 2000a, b; Demoulin & Ritter, 2000; Kilted et al., 1999; Kolstad & 
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Ritter, 2000; Reiger & Demoulin, 2000; Schmidt, 2001, 2003a, & 2003b). The study 
made use of multiple regression analysis techniques, and it reported that "JROTC 
programs provide critical skills in relation to democratic maturity that are deemed 
essential for success in a democracy" (Demoulin & Ritter, 2000, p. 411). 
Except for the 1992 Navy sponsored study and the 1999 CSIS Study, the major 
limitation of the JROTC perception studies and the academic outcome-related studies 
was sample size. Predominantly, these studies focused on just one or on small 
numbers of JROTC units. In addition, recent studies on NJROTC are virtually 
nonexistent. 
With regard to dissertations or peer-reviewed articles from those who oppose 
JROTC on high school campuses, only two articles in the peer-reviewed literature 
were found: Berlowitz (2000) and Ayers (2006). Both articles provide facts and 
justification for the removal of JROTC from high school campuses. The main claim 
of both is that JROTC is a military recruiting vehicle and that high school students 
should not be exposed to it. Also elaborated is the fact that the military discriminates 
against females and homosexuals and that the military should not be allowed access 
to students or student information because the military is not an equal opportunity 
employer. Both articles lack the balance that might be expected of scholarly journals, 
particularly the Ayers article, which was printed in Phi Delta Kappan. However, as 
suggested previously, the studies or articles supporting the JROTC program may lack 
balance as well, supporting the argument that it is difficult for writers to put their 
agendas aside. 
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There are also organizations with anti-JROTC Web sites that provide opposing 
viewpoints about the JROTC program; most of these viewpoints are also anecdotal in 
nature. Morris (2003) in her dissertation on the JROTC program lists the following 
organizations that take an opposing view of the establishment of JROTC programs in 
secondary education systems: 
1. American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) 
2. Central Committee for Conscientious Objection (CCCO) 
3. Center for Defense Information (CDI) 
4. Women Against Military Madness (WAMM) 
5. Veterans for Peace (VP) 
6. Committee Opposed to Militarism and the Draft (COMD) 
7. War Registers League 
8. Gay and Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation (GLADD) 
9. Project on Youth and Non-Military Opportunities (Project YANO) 
The main argument against JROTC is that it is being used as a tool by the 
military to increase access from the pool of future enlistees. Other arguments against 
JROTC include the following from the Central Committee for Conscientious 
Objectors (CCCO, 2005): 
1. The secondary education system is no place for an institution that prevents 
critical thinking of students in gun-free schools. 
2. JROTC costs school districts tens of thousands of dollars. 
3. The program violates the principle of local control. 
4. JROTC provides limited oversight of the curriculum or instructors. 
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5. Textbooks are biased, racist, and bigoted. 
6. JROTC promotes guns and warfare, which promote gangs and gang 
violence. 
In recent years, JROTC programs have come under pressure to prohibit schools 
from including JROTC classes. A controversial decision in 2006 by the San Francisco 
Board of Education attempted to ban JROTC based on the military's discriminatory 
stance on gays in the military (Mattimore, 2006 & Maxwell, 2006). In November 
2008, proponents of JROTC gathered enough signatures to put the measure to 
continue JROTC on the ballot. The non-binding measure, Proposition V, passed with 
53 percent of the vote (Johnson, 2008). Additionally, California and other states are 
considering removing physical education credit for JROTC, which would take away a 
graduation requirement credit incentive for taking JROTC (Cdr. Vizcarra, personal 
communication, February 27, 2009). 
Other opponents of JROTC, including some military program managers, have 
shown the sentiment that the military should not fund a citizenship education program 
with scarce resources. Most military program managers are continuously being asked 
to cut any items that do not have a direct effect on the current war on terrorism. The 
JROTC program currently has congressional backing, but with the continuous 
demands to use the military as a "911 emergency response" force throughout the 
world, changes in budget priorities are likely to occur (Corbett & Coumbe, 2001). 
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JROTC's Influence on Military Accession, Retention, and Attrition 
Studying the impact NJROTC has had on military accessions and retentions is a 
departure from the preponderance of JROTC studies, which generally reported 
findings on academic or social benefits. In fact, only four studies from the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) provide an empirical examination of JROTC participation 
on enlistment and retention. The Accession Policy Directorate in the Office of the 
Under Secretary of Defense (OUSD) for Personnel Readiness sponsored the first 
study, A Comprehensive Study of the Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps Program 
(Laurence & Estrada, 2003). The second study, An Empirical Examination of the 
Impact of JROTC Participation on Enlistment, Retention, and Attrition, followed up 
on the results of the first study and was a research project by two attending students 
(Days & Ang, 2004). The third NPS-sponsored study, Naval Junior Officers' 
Training Corps: A Comparison with Other Successful Youth Development Programs 
and an Analysis of Military Recruits Who Participate in JROTC (Walls, 2003). The 
fourth is Analysis of Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps Participation and its 
Effects on First Term Attrition, Promotion, and Reenlistment (Hentz & Packwood, 
2007) 
In the first study, the Naval Postgraduate School of Business and Public Policy 
was commissioned to review JROTC curricular materials, budgeting issues, and 
recruitment. The results of this research provided several findings of interest relating 
to military enlistment and retention. Based on descriptive analysis techniques using 
Defense Management Data Center (DMDC) data from 1990-2001, researchers at NPS 
determined that the Army had the greatest number of recruits who participated in 
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JROTC, followed by the Marine Corps, the Navy, and the Air Force. The study also 
confirmed that JROTC participants left the military during their first-term enlistment 
at a lower rate than their non-JROTC peers did. First-term attrition, defined by 
military personnel who fail to complete their first term of enlistment, was lowest for 
minority JROTC participants. 
Though the NPS study by Laurence and Estrada (2003) provided unique 
empirical evidence that JROTC participation has a positive influence on enlistment 
and attrition, there exist several limitations. The researcher cautions that the number 
of recruits with JROTC participation is relatively small compared to the non-JROTC 
recruits, reflecting an imbalance in the comparison groups. The study also reported 
data only on enlisted personnel. In addition, the data were not sorted by the recruits' 
respective service JROTC program. Since the data set stops in 2001, these numbers 
may have changed, especially given the events that have occurred since September 
11, 2001. Nonetheless, this study confirms the DMDC as a good source of data for 
future empirical analyses of the return on investment for the NJROTC program. 
The second study, An Empirical Examination of the Impact of JROTC 
Participation on Enlistment, Retention, and Attrition, by Days and Ang (2004), used 
two databases: the 1980 High School and Beyond (HS&B) Survey data and DMDC 
data. The High School and Beyond data were collected on two cohorts of 
sophomores and seniors, commencing in 1980, with follow-up surveys in 1982, 1984, 
1986, and 1992 (for the original sophomores only). The study contained a national 
stratified sample from 1,222 schools in which 36 sophomores and 36 seniors were 
randomly selected for a total of 14,825 sophomores and 11,955 seniors. The 
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information focused on high school programs, family background, goals, values, post-
high school plans, and post-high school employment. 
Using multiple regression analysis techniques from the HS&B cohort data, the 
researchers found that JROTC participation increased the probability of enlisting in 
the military. However, when they changed their model to account for students who 
may have had the inclination to join the military before participating in JROTC, there 
was no correlation between JROTC participation and enlistment. The method used to 
measure previous inclination (i.e., self-selection) was a two-stage least squares and 
bivariate probit equation. The latency of the data complicated the findings from the 
HS&B survey even further. Even if the initial analyses were accurate, it would only 
hold true for this 1980 cohort and may not be applicable to JROTC graduates of the 
21st century. Additionally, the database had only a category of JROTC and did not 
have sub-categories for NJROTC. 
Days and Ang (2004) also obtained Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps 
enlisted cohort data from the DMDC. The data obtained for this study focused on 
enlisted personnel who entered the service from 1980 to 2000. The extraction of 
these data sets was the precursor of their empirical analysis of JROTC on military 
enlistment, reenlistment, and attrition. The distributions included military enlistment 
by JROTC participants, recruits with JROTC participation by service, recruits with 
JROTC by gender, recruits with JROTC by race, and recruits with JROTC by Armed 
Forces Qualification Test (AFQT). The AFQT test is also known as the Armed 
Service Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) and is used by the military to assess a 
recruit's job qualifications. 
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Using regression analysis, researchers found that JROTC participation had a 
positive influence on reenlistments. Further, JROTC graduates tended to stay longer 
in the military than their non-JROTC counterparts did. Not included in the study 
were unemployment rates, which could have been the overriding factor for JROTC 
cadets to enlist and/or remain in the Navy. Finally, the DMDC data can be sorted by 
the respective service JROTC program, which is the focus of this research. The 
NJROTC information is tracked under the category of "Youth Program." 
The third NPS-sponsored study by Walls (2003), NavalJunior Officers' 
Training Corps: A Comparison With Other Successful Youth Development Programs 
and an Analysis of Military Recruits Who Participate in JROTC, compared JROTC 
with other successful youth programs, such as Boys and Girls Clubs, Scouts, YMCA, 
YWCA, 4-H, Camp Fire, religious youth programs, sports programs, and others. 
Walls also analyzed pre-existing DMDC data from 1990 to 2001 to compare military 
enlisted accessions between those who participated in youth programs and those who 
did not. The main finding of this study was that JROTC is similar to other youth 
programs in having a positive effect on youth development. The study also claimed 
that no other single high school youth program could match JROTC in its size, level 
of funding, and scope of accomplishments (Walls, 2003). 
The final NPS study (Hentz & Packwood, 2007) investigated whether JROTC 
participation significantly impacts first term attrition, promotion, reenlistment, time to 
attrition, and time to promotion using DMDC data from 1994-2000. The results 
indicated that JROTC had a statistically positive association with promotion, 
reenlistment and time to attrition. The present study added to the Hentz and 
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Packwood research by using DMDC data from 2001 to 2006; moreover, this current 
research study was specifically focused on the Navy JROTC program rather than all 
the service programs. 
Similar to the research of this present study, these four studies, cited in this 
section, used pre-existing DMDC data, though the data were limited to 2001 or prior. 
The latency of the data, plus the fact that these studies do not provide detailed 
information on the NJROTC program, adds greater relevancy to research on the Navy 
JROTC program. 
The Navy Recruiting Command (NRC) 
The rationale to consider using NJROTC as a recruitment tool for the Navy is 
timely, especially considering the growing evidence that the other services, primarily 
the Army and Marine Corps, are increasing their recruiting efforts at high schools 
with JROTC units (Department of the Army, 1999; Dr. William McHenry, personal 
communication, June 20, 2005). The Navy Recruiting Command (NRC), located in 
Millington, Tennessee, is responsible for recruiting men and women into the active 
duty and Naval Reserve enlisted force. The NRC also recruits officers for Officer 
Candidate School and processes applications for Naval Reserve Officer Training 
Corps (NROTC). Officer applications for the Naval Academy are not processed by 
the NRC; these are done by the Naval Academy itself. The NRC manages over 1600 
recruiting installations with almost 8,000 personnel and budgets of nearly $1.2 billion 
annually. The recruiting advertising budget for 2006 was over $100 million (Cdr. 
Glen Kaemmerer, personal communication, November 7, 2005). The Navy has met 
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its recruiting goals for the past 25 years. For the past 10 years, it has recruited an 
average of 50,000 enlisted personnel and 3000 officers per year. 
Although the Navy has achieved its recruiting goals for some time, it has not 
always received the highest quality of recruit or met its diversification goals. The 
Navy Recruiting Command measures qualification for potential military jobs of the 
recruit by using the AFQT test. Since 2003, the Navy has raised the bar slightly by 
increasing the percentage of Test Score Category I-IIIA recruits (those scoring above 
50 on the AFQT of the ASVAB) from 65 percent in FY03 to 67 percent in FY04. In 
addition, JROTC cadets receiving advance pay grade status in the Navy have 
increased (2003 = 380, 2004 = 404, 2005 = 645). Between 2003 and 2005, the Navy 
also improved the number of recruits with high school diplomas slightly and raised 
the percentage of new recruits with college experience (12 or more college semester 
units). Not to detract from these positive performance metrics, but these results may 
have a connection to the Navy's recent attraction as a military service—especially 
since the Army and Marine Corps are doing the preponderance of the heavy fighting 
in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Proving that NJROTC participation can provide savings for the recruiting 
budget or provide access to improve the quality and diversification of Navy 
accessions is of considerable interest to the Navy. The Chief of Naval Operations 
recently stated he is looking for new ways to recruit minorities, especially Black 
Americans. Currently, the percentage of Blacks in the Navy officer corps is seven 
percent, which is well below the national population average and that of DOD. In an 
email to the Navy senior leadership, the then Chief of Naval Operations stated: 
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I am interested in truly thinking about diversity in new ways and breaking some 
china. I want to achieve measurable, permanent effects, so that—even through 
somebody's benign neglect in the future—what we do cannot be undone.. .The 
diversity of our Navy matters—a very great deal. I know you share my desire 
to make a difference and thank you in advance for your continued support. 
(Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Michael Mullen, personal communication, 
September 22, 2005) 
Summary 
Given the forecast of austere military budgets to fund the Global War on 
Terror, the findings of this research should be of considerable interest to Navy 
JROTC officials and recruiters as they justify their programs' budgets. The reviewed 
literature on the JROTC program revealed positive information concerning the 
influence that JROTC has had on the nation's youth for the past 80 years. The 
legislative history pointed to three pieces of legislation supporting the expansion of 
the program; specific to the Navy JROTC program was the ROTC Vitalization Act of 
1964, which added the Navy and Air Force JROTC programs. Pertinent background 
facts were provided in this literature review on the organization, curriculum, and cost, 
followed by a synthesis of the related research. Notably, only four studies in the 
literature, all from the Naval Post-Graduate School, offer insight on JROTC 
participation as an explanatory variable supporting the program's direct return on 
investment to the military. The findings from these studies offer some empirical 
evidence on JROTC participation having a positive influence on military enlisted 
accessions and retention. Additionally, these studies confirmed that there has not 
been a comprehensive study on Navy's JROTC's influence on military accessions, 
retentions, and attrition. Last, background information on the Navy Recruiting 
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Command was offered to support or refute those that believe NJROTC should be 




The scope of this dissertation was limited to empirical analysis of the Navy's 
JROTC program with a primary focus on the impact NJROTC participation has on 
Navy accessions and retentions. This study has increasing significance because since 
September 11, 2001, the Navy has directed all Navy program managers to justify 
their programs based on priorities to support the war on terrorism. Funding a 
citizenship-training program, which the NJROTC program emphasizes in its mission 
statement, did not make the official list of Navy priorities (U.S. Department of the 
Navy, 2004). On the other hand, recruiting a quality force representing the diversity 
of America did make the list. Thus, having insight into the intentions of NJROTC 
graduates and comparing demographics between NJROTC and non-NJROTC Navy 
accessions is of interest with respect to Navy recruiting. Also of significance is 
determining whether NJROTC accessions stay in the Navy at a higher rate than do 
non-NJROTC accessions. The study also provides NJROTC program managers a 
unique insight into the NJROTC descriptive and inferential data, which may provide 
increased awareness on the efficacy of the NJROTC program. There are currently 
700 secondary schools on the waiting list for JROTC, with Navy having 198 on the 
waiting list (Barbassa, 2008; Teresa Casey, NJROTC Headquarters Staff, personal 
communication, February 27, 2009). Given this, the research reported in this 
dissertation may also be of benefit to Navy decision-makers in deciding which 
NJROTC area or region to add or remove units. 
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In this chapter, there are five main sections: one, which describes the data and 
how it was collected; two, which describes the data analysis plan based on the 
research questions and hypotheses; three and four, which address selection bias and 
limitations of the proposed research; and finally, a summary of this methodology 
section. 
Data Collection 
There is no single tracking system of what happens to NJROTC cadets after 
high school graduation. The Department of Defense is on record for not tracking how 
many cadets enlist in the military (Barbassa, 2007). The reason is based on Privacy 
Act concerns to protect high school students. The Navy does do an exit survey for 
their NJROTC graduates but does not track whether these cadets actually join the 
Navy. The two databases consulted for this study, as noted above, were the Navy's 
JROTC Unit Management System (JUMS) database, from which the career intent of 
NJROTC graduates are maintained, and the Defense Manpower Data Center 
(DMDC), which provides data on all Navy enlisted accessions including NJROTC 
participants. Both the JUMS and DMDC databases used in this study contained the 
population data of NJROTC graduates and Navy accessions from 2001 to 2005. 
The JUMS database includes variables that record NJROTC graduate career 
intent data (Appendix A). NJROTC program managers in Pensacola, Florida, 
maintain the database, and permission to use it is required. Each NJROTC Unit at a 
school collects career intent data annually on graduating seniors and records it into 
the JUMS database, which also provides the Navy Training Service Command 
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(NTSC) with up-to-date information on student enrollment demographics and 
financial accounting of the unit expenses. 
The JUMS data have been recorded since 1994. The five years obtained for 
this study ranged from calendar year 2001 to 2005. The relevant JUMS data for this 
study are included in Table 2, which shows the career intentions of graduating 
NJROTC cadets. 
Table 2 
NJROTC Graduate Career Intent 2001 - 2005 
NJROTC GRADUATES 
TOTAL COLLEGE 
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Note. Distribution of NJROTC Graduates Intentions, 2001-2005. 
From JROTC Unit Management System Database, by U.S. Department of the Navy, 2006. 
Approximately two percent of NJROTC graduates pursue both reserve/guard 
and post secondary education pursuits. 
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Table 3 provides a description of the variables after the initial coding of the 
variables. These variables were the primary demographic variables that were 
analyzed on the NJROTC graduating cadets. 
Table 3 
Navy JUMS Variable Description 
Variables 
School Year 





Military Service Branch 
Other 
NJROTC Geographic Area 
Zip Code 
Definition 
2001 through 2005 
5 numeric digit code given to each NJROTC unit 
0 = White, 1 = Black, 2 = Hispanic, 3 = Asian, 4 = other 
0 = Male, 1 = Female 
0 = 4 Year College, 1 = 2 Year College, 3 = Junior College, 4 = 
Technical or Vocational School 
0 = Academy, 1 = ROTC Scholarship, 2 = ROTC Non Scholarship, 3 = 
Boost, 4 = Enlisted 
0 = Navy, 1 = Army, 2 = Air Force, 3 = Marine Corps, 4 = Coast 
Guard/Merchant Marines 
0 = Employment Only, 1 - Undecided, 2 = Other 
Area 3 through 13 defined by its respective number 
5 Digit Zip Code based on location of NJROTC unit 
Note. Distribution of NJROTC Graduates Intentions, 2001- 2005. 
From JROTC Unit Management System Database, by U.S. Department of the Navy, 2006. 
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The Navy enlisted accessions data are derived from pre-existing data collected 
from DMDC (Monterey, California), and it is used with their permission. The 
DMDC enlisted data are divided into cohort files of those who entered the Navy in a 
given fiscal year. Scrambling the social security numbers of the cases assured subject 
anonymity. The five cohorts obtained for this study ranged from fiscal year (FY) 
2001 to 2005 and are shown in Table 4. A fiscal year for the military runs from 
October through September. 
Table 4 


































Note. Distribution of naval accessions by race for 2001- 2005. From Defense 
Management Data Center Database, by U.S. Department of Defense, 2006. 
The primary variable of interest for this research is NJROTC graduates who 
were identified in the cohort files under a variable entitled "Youth Program." 
Additional military "Youth Program" variables in this category were the other service 
JROTC programs, Cadet Air Patrol, Sea Cadets, and the Reserve Officer Training 
Corps, none of which were considered in this research. A complete list of the 
variables selected for this research from the DMDC can be found in Table 5. This 
table provides a description of the variable categories. 
Table 5 
DM DC variable description 
Variable 
RETAIN {Limited to Navy accession for 
FY 2001 - 2003) 
NJROTC (variable transformed from the 
Youth Program Code variable) 
Gender 
Youth Program Code 
RACE 
Socioeconomic Status (variable based 
on Median Income transformed from 
2000 Census data merged with Zip 
code) 
REGION (variable based on zip code of 
NJROTC unit) 





0 if the Navy accession was separated within three years of enlistment 
, 1 if accession completed at least the first three years of enlistment 
0 if the Navy accession was a Non NJROTC accession, l f o r NJROTC 
accession who participated in JROTC for three or four years of high 
school 
0 if the Navy accession was a Male, 1 if the accession was a Female 
"Youth Program" variables in this category were the JROTC programs, 
Cadet Air Patrol, Sea Cadets, and the Reserve Officer Training Corps. 
0 if the Navy accession's race was White, 1 if race was Black, 2 if the 
race was Asian, 3 if the race was Other 
0 if the Navy accession's Medium Income group was from the Hi 
Income Group, 1 If from Lo Income group, 2 if from Medium Lo 
income group, 3 if from Medium Hi income group 
"W" it the Navy accession's region was from West, "SW" if from the 
Southwest, "MW" if from the Midwest, "SE" if from Southeast, "NE" if 
from the Northeast, "O" if from other. 
" 1 " it the Navy accession's AFQI category was 1, "l" it AFQT category 
was 2, "3A" if AFQT category was 3A, "3B" if AFQT category was 3B, 4 
if AFQT category was 4, 5 if AFQT category was 5, "UNK" if AFQT 
category was unknown. 
Defined based on accession year from 2001 to 2005 
Defined by numerous Separation codes. 
5 Digit Zip Code based on home of record of Navy accession. 
Note. Distribution of naval accessions by race for 2001- 2005. From Defense 
Management Data Center Database, by U.S. Department of Defense, 2006. 
The first step in preparing the demographic information (the data cleaning 
process) was to transfer the data into Statistical Processes for the Social Sciences 
(SPSS) so that the exploration process could begin. The difficulty of cleaning and 
organizing five years of data, 2001 to 2005, contained in 10 large data sets was 
greater than was initially expected. The JUMS data had over 8000 records with 12 
variables and DMDC had approximately 50,000 records with 11 variables. Missing 
data were to be expected in large data sets; however, for both the DMDC and JUMS 
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data bases, missing data was not a real problem in that missing data for most variables 
received were labeled as unknown, or in the case of one variable, socioeconomic 
status, the missing data was removed. The socioeconomic status variable was created 
during the research when Zip code data were transformed into the socioeconomic 
status variable using median income data from the 2000 Census. Eliminating 2,239 
thousand records out of 134,300 for socioeconomic status provided the research with 
98.3 percent sample of the population data for socioeconomic status. The missing 
socioeconomic status data were removed during the logistic regression modeling. To 
account for the impact of the missing socioeconomic status data on the other predictor 
variables, a means test was conducted between the population and sample data, 
resulting in no significant difference between the considered variables for the 
population and sample databases. The means test conducted is further elaborated in 
the Results chapter with a detailed analysis offered in Appendix C. Notwithstanding, 
several other challenges presented themselves transforming variables into information 
suitable to provide insight into the research questions. 
DMDC data information on Hispanics beyond 2002 was not consistent with 
the 2000 and 2001 DMDC datasets. For 2003-2005, the DMDC data set had problems 
that made it virtually impossible to classify an independent response for the Hispanic 
category. Thus, the Hispanics category for the Race variable is not used; instead, the 
following race categories were used: White, Black, Asian, and Other. 
To answer the research questions, the following variables had to be 
transformed using SPSS: 
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• JUMS intent to join active service branch and reserve branch were merged to 
create a single integrated service branch variable to highlight which service 
benefited most, active or reserve, from NJROTC graduates. 
• JUMS intent to pursue education only and education with employment were 
merged to create a single integrated education variable to emphasize the 
amount of NJROTC cadets pursuing post-secondary education goals. 
• For JUMS data, Zip code corresponding to NJROTC Unit Identification Code 
(UIC) was added as a variable, which was necessary to provide 
socioeconomic status on the NJROTC cadets. 
• Using 2000 Census income data, the Zip code data for NJROTC graduating 
cadets and Navy accessions were transformed into a socioeconomic status 
variable for both DMDC and JUMs data. 
• DMDC Youth Program Code - This variable contains several youth program 
categories. A new variable was created to isolate NJROTC and non-NJROTC 
accessions allowing various demographic data to be compared. 
• DMDC separation program designation (SPD) codes were regrouped to 
isolate categories of adverse attrition, non-adverse, unknown, and non-
separated for the accessions first three years of their enlistment. Additionally, 
to create a dichotomous variable for the binary logistic regression model, a 
variable of separated and not separated was created. 
• To compare the NJROTC and non-NJROTC accessions by location, a new 
variable was created from Zip code data based on U.S. region. The five U.S. 
Regions were West, Southwest, Midwest, Southeast, and Northeast. 
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Research Questions/Hypotheses Data Analysis Plan 
There are four research questions and three hypotheses to guide this 
dissertation. 
Research Question 1: What are the NJROTC graduates' post high school 
career intentions by race, gender, location, and socioeconomic status? 
The data were summarized using the following pertinent demographic 
variables: location of NJROTC Unit, gender, race, and career intent following 
graduation. The variables for career intent were enlisted, officer training programs, 
branch of service, employment, college, trade/vocational, and other. New variables 
for socioeconomic status and region were created using the NJROTC Unit location. 
All data were nominal. Cross-tabulation procedures using the computer program 
Statistical Program for the Social Sciences (SPSS) were used to describe the 
NJROTC post graduation intentions for the demographic factors cited in the research 
question. 
Research Question 2: Are there significant differences between NJROTC 
participants and non-NJROTC participants for Navy enlisted accessions (DMDC 
data) by race, gender, AFQT score, location, and socioeconomic status? 
Data were summarized using the following pertinent demographic variables: 
date and location of Navy enlistment, Navy JROTC, gender, race, and mental aptitude 
defined by their Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) score. The location of 
Navy enlistment was based on the recruits' five-numbered Zip code and provided 
information on the recruits' socioeconomic status when matched with Zip code 2000 
Census Data. The Zip code data were also used to create the U.S. region variable. All 
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data were nominal except the AFQT score, which is ordinal. Cross-tabulation 
procedures using SPSS were used to compare the differences of the groups cited in 
the research question. 
The hypothesis this research question attempted to support or refute was: 
Hypothesis 1: Among Navy enlisted accessions, there is no significant difference 
between those who participated in NJROTC and non-NJROTC students. 
Research Question 3: Are there significant differences between NJROTC 
participants and non-NJROTC participants for Navy enlisted by race, gender, AFQT 
score, location, and socioeconomic status? 
Descriptive and inferential statistics were used in an attempt to answer this 
question. The variable of importance in determining whether there is any discernible 
benefit for the Navy based on retention was the subject's accession and separation 
date. The retention variable was based on the military definition of first-term 
enlistment, which for the vast majority of Navy recruits lasts three years. The three 
years assessed were Navy accessions from 2001 - 2003. The reason that later years 
were not assessed was that the study needed to follow Navy accessions for a three 
year period. Since, the data from DMDC were received in 2007, which tracked Navy 
accessions up until 2006, the 2003 cohort was the last group of Navy accessions used 
for research question three. The two main groups for the research were Navy 
accessions who participated in NJROTC and the non-NJROTC Navy accessions. 
Also assessed, using logistic regression, were the interaction effects of race, gender, 
AFQT score, location, and socioeconomic status variables. 
50 
Using coded DMDC data, a regression model was created to determine whether 
any inferences could be drawn on the impact NJROTC participation has on enlisted 
retention. The dependent variable for this model was based on the binary response 
for those who continue to remain in the military after the time period specified as first 
enlistment and those who leave the military during this same timeframe. Since this 
dependent variable was a binary response, logistic regression techniques were 
suitable to determine whether there were significant differences among the primary 
independent variable, NJROTC participation, as well as possible interaction effects of 
other variables such as race, gender, location of enlistment (U.S. Region), 
socioeconomic status (based on Zip Code and Census data), and AFQT score 
Many social science researchers conduct studies that have dependent variables 
of dichotomous nature. In fact, the use of logistic regression has expanded so much 
that it could soon take over from multiple regression as the research tool of choice. 
Logistic regression is different from ordinary least squares (OLS) regression in that 
homogeneity of variance (does not assume homoscedasticity) and normality of errors 
are not assumed. In fact, there are three main assumptions required for logistic 
regression (Meyers, 222, 2006): 
There must be an absence of perfect multicollinearity. 
There must be no specification errors (i.e., all relevant predictors are 
included and irrelevant predictors are excluded). 
The independent variables must be measured at the summative response 
scale, interval, or ratio level (although dichotomous variables are also 
allowed). 
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The variables and their respective coding for the initial a priori model were 
previously shown in Table 4. The coding of the variables is essential for properly 
understanding the results of SPSS model runs. In fact, SPSS will automatically recode 
the variables if they are not coded properly, which can result in significant confusion 
for researchers. In SPSS, for both the dependent and independent variable, the 
comparison group should be coded one for a dichotomous variable or one or greater 
for categorical variables while the referent or control group (sometimes referred to as 
the omitted variable) should be coded with zero. Another approach is to create a 
dummy dichotomous variable for each category of the categorical variables. Either 
method, with properly coded variables, will yield the same results. 
There are two reasons why ordinary least squares are not appropriate when the 
dependent variable is dichotomous (Meyers, 2006). (1) The equal variance 
assumption is violated (the assumption of homoscedasticity) and (2) that using least 
squares can produce values greater than one or less than zero. This evidenced in 
Figure 2 where the shape of the best fit line for logistic regression is an S-shaped line 
versus the straight line of a linear function (Meyers, 2006). 
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Y = 1 
Y = 0 
Linear Probability Model 
Logistic Regression Model 
1 2 ^ ' 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
Figure 2: Comparing the Linear Probability and Logistic Regression Models (Meyers, 
p. 225, 2006) 
In conducting the analysis, it is important to know that data are transformed 
using the natural log (In), which is what bends the data to fit the S shaped curve. The 
main goal of logistic regression is to predict a case's membership in the comparison 
group signified by the likelihood or probability of an event occurring based on a 
given value for the predictor variable. As cited from Meyers (2006), there are two 
mathematical steps used in a formal explanation of the model: Step 1, forming the 
logistic regression equation (1) transforms the probability of an event occurring to the 
natural log (In) of the odds that a case belongs to the response group. 
In [odds] = a + biXi + b2X2 + • • • + b„X„ (1) 
Substituted into the left side of the equation is the natural log, which in OLS is the 
predicted dependent variable. "The b coefficients indicate the change in log odds of 
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membership for any 1-unit change in the independent variables" (Meyers, p, 227, 
2006). Hence, logistic regression is just OLS using the logit as the outcome variable. 
To provide clarity, Meyers (2006) translates the outcome variable by symbolizing 
predicted group membership as gpred (la): 
gpred = In [odds] = a + biXi (la) 
To see how this works consider the following example: Meyers (2006) lets the 
outcome variable be seeking psychiatric therapy or not and then lets Xi be a 
dichotomous variable for gender - coded with one for males and zero for females. 
Following a logistic regression run, the results yielded -1.099 for the constant "a" 
and 1.792 for the coefficient, "b". This linear formula results in the probability of 
females seeking therapy is .693 (lb) and males seeking therapy is .250 (lc). 
gPred= -1-099 + 1.792(1) = 0.693 (lb) 
gpred = -1.099 + 1.792(0) = 0.250 (lc) 
Step 2, Computing the logit outcome: This is accomplished by inserting gpred into 
equation (2), known as the antilog function (e - 2.7182), to transform the log odds 
into probabilities resulting in a .667 probability that females will seek therapy (2a) 
and a .250 probability that males will seek therapy (2b): 
egpred / { l + egpred) = p r e d i c t e d probability (2) 
2.718693/(1 + 2.718693) = .667 (2a) 
2.718~1099 /(l + 2.718"L099) = .250 (2b) 
Calculating the odds ratio between the comparison group and the reference 
group is one of the primary objectives in logistic regression. However, odds are 
different from probability, in that odds are not bounded by zero and one. Odds can go 
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from zero to infinity. If there is an equal chance of an event occurring then the odds 
are one to one. Odds that are equal to one are the same as failing to reject the null 
hypothesis in logistic regression. Odds that are less than one indicate that there is a 
less of a chance of an event occurring. Moreover, an odds of 1.25 is the same as 
saying that there is a 25 percent increase in the chance of an event occurring. The 
odds ratio is calculated using "e " (the exponential function) and the "6 " coefficient 
for the comparison group. To find the odds ratio of the comparison group to the 
reference group, one raises e to the b power (3). Since b = 1.792 the odds ratio 
indicates that females are six times more likely than males to seek psychiatric therapy 
(3a). 
eb = odds ratio (3) 
2.718L792 = 6.0 (3a) 
The SPSS binary logistic regression application computes the odds ratio for the 
predictor variables as well as other results. Essential to this research is interpreting the 
results of the model runs (Meyers, 2006). 
• The first step is to evaluate the "a " and "6 " coefficients and their 
standard errors. Coefficients in logistic regression are determined by a 
maximum likelihood estimation (MLE). The objective of this technique 
is to maximize the log likelihood of the odds that the observed values of 
the dependent variable may be predicted from the observed values of the 
predictors. MLE is an iterative algorithm that starts with an initial 
"guestimate" and then determines the direction and magnitude of the 
"a" and "6 " coefficients. In contrast, OLS Regression determines the 
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coefficients by minimizing the sum of squared distances to the 
regression line. Analogous to OLS, "b" coefficients close to zero 
indicate that there is no effect caused by the independent variable. 
• The/? value test result determines whether the independent variable is 
significantly associated with the dependent variable. It is from the "p " 
value a researcher normally assesses as to whether the variable should 
be included in the model or not. 
• Next, the odds ratios for the predictor variable and their respective 
confidence intervals are assessed. These results were of primary 
importance in determining the odds ratio, as discussed previously, of 
NJROTC participation along with interaction effects of the other 
predictor variables on Navy retention. 
• Finally, there are a number of tests to assess the validity of the model. 
The significance of these tests (Likelihood Ration Test, Omnibus Test 
of Model Coefficients, Model Summary, Psuedo R2, Hosmer and 
Lemeshow Test and Wald Test) is discussed in Chapter IV when the 
results of the binary logistic regression model are discussed. 
The hypothesis this research question attempted to support or refute was: 
Hypothesis 2: Among Navy enlisted who are retained in the Navy, there is no 
significant difference between those who participated in NJROTC and non-NJROTC 
students. 
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Research Question 4: Is there a significant difference between NJROTC graduate 
cadets' intent to enlist in the Navy and their actual behavior by race, gender, and 
location? 
Differential research was conducted on the NJROTC graduate intention to 
enlist in the Navy (JUMS data) compared to the actual Navy enlistment data (DMDC 
data). Cross-tabulation procedures using SPSS were used to compare the differences 
of the two databases cited in the research question. However, a major problem 
linking these two databases was that due to Privacy Act reasons for high school 
students social security numbers were not provided in the JUMS data. As explicated 
in the results chapter, there were also other problems in drawing direct comparison 
between the JUMS and the DMDC databases. 
The hypothesis this research question attempted to support or refute was: 
Hypothesis 3: There is no difference between the JUMS database on NJROTC cadet 
graduates' intent to enlist and those that actually enlist in the Navy. 
Selection Bias 
While selection bias is usually a concern when examining the decisions of 
individuals to engage in a particular course of action, one can argue that selection bias 
was not present in this study based on the following reasons. First, with respect to 
participation in NJROTC, the JUMS data provides the population of individuals 
enrolled in NJROTC for the period of analysis. The focus of this analysis was 
whether there were distinctive characteristics of the NJROTC population relative to 
the population of the US Navy, that is, attributes of two distinct populations to which 
individuals select themselves were compared. Since the entire population was 
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observed, the typical sampling problems of the properties of the non-observed 
observations were not of concern. 
Second, with respect to the testable hypotheses whether NJROTC participation 
has a discernable impact on first term service outcomes, the population of individuals 
who ascend to military service and who complete (and fail to complete) their first 
term of service were observed. The focus of this analysis was to examine the 
behavior of the population of individuals who choose to ascend to service. The 
impact of NJROTC graduates who chose not to ascend was not a concern of this 
study. While the differential analysis of NJROTC on individual outcomes of those 
who choose a different, non-military course of action is interesting, it was beyond the 
scope of this study and was thus not germane to the issue of selection bias. 
Limitations and Delimitations 
As stated previously, the scope of this dissertation was to determine the impact 
the Navy's JROTC program has on Navy accessions and retentions. The following 
are limitations and delimitations: 
Limitations 
The following issues placed limitations on the research: 
• Because of privacy issues discussed above, social security numbers of NJROTC 
cadets cannot be accessed. If cadet SSN were available, the impact NJROTC 
participation has on a variety of demographic variables with respect to Navy 
accessions and retentions could be easily assessed. 
• A limitation in the measurement of socioeconomic status is that the recruit may 
have moved from his or her family home and that the recruit's reported Zip 
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code might be from a different income level. It is assumed that this relocation 
error increases as a recruit delays enlistment following his or her 18l birthday. 
Further, since the median income correlation was based on the 2000 census, 
new Zip codes for 2001, 2002, and 2003 were reported as having no median 
income. These missing cases, which corresponded to less than 1.7 percent of 
the data, were removed from the database for any analysis on socioeconomic 
status. The four median income groups were divided into four categories: 
Low (0 up to $43,601), Medium Low ($43,601 up to$53,026), Medium High 
($53,026 up to $66,082), and High ($66,082). 
• Another limitation of the present study was that the data from the DMDC do 
not report JROTC or NJROTC participation of fewer than two years. It is not 
reported because Navy enlisted personnel only get grade advancement credit 
if they have completed three or more years of JROTC. Thus, the enlisted data 
were limited to NJROTC cadets with three or more years as cadets. 
• There may be bias associated with the self-reported data on graduate intent of 
the JUMS database. This has ramifications for both Research Questions 1 and 
4. 
Delimitations 
Delimitations are self-imposed limitations in the research. These are: 
• The analysis of the data focused on NJROTC pre-existing data from 2001-2005 
for both the JUMS and DMDC data. 
• The DMDC data are limited to enlisted personnel only, since the obtained 
DMDC data provided information on enlisted personnel only. 
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• There are three main Navy officer entry programs: Naval Academy, Naval 
Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC), and Officer Candidate School 
(OCS). Only the U.S. Naval Academy and NROTC track NJROTC 
participation. NROTC program managers denied access to their OPMIS 
database, based on Privacy Act concerns. Given this obstacle, access to the 
other Navy officer program data was not pursued. 
• Research Questions 3 had only three FY cohorts (2001, 2002, 2003), based on 
the fact that the final accessible DMDC data was FY06. This delimitation 
assumes that the metric for retention is whether a recruit completed the first 
three years of his or her enlistment. 
Summary 
The purpose of the research was to determine whether NJROTC participation 
has an influence on Navy accessions and retentions. The study's primary focus is on 
NJROTC and non-NJROTC participants who enlist in the Navy. It also provides 
demographic information on the career intentions of NJROTC graduates. The 
research methodology is quantitative, combining descriptive and inferential statistic 
techniques to answer the four research questions and three hypotheses. 
The implications of this study go beyond the previous JROTC research using 
survey methods studying perceptions and learning outcomes. The specific focus of 
this research was to analyze pre-existing data to gather descriptive and inferential 
evidence on the influence NJROTC participation has on Navy accessions and 
retentions. Empirical evidence is provided in Chapter IV and V on the efficacy of the 
NJROTC program. Research also provides Navy JROTC program managers 
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empirical evidence on the salient effect of the directed budget priorities for the Global 
War on Terror. Lastly, quantitative evidence is shown in the findings that NJROTC 
cadets intend to join and are actually retained in the Navy at a higher rate than non-
NJROTC accessions, which adds credence for the Navy to consider the NJROTC as a 




The purpose of this study was to determine whether NJROTC participation 
has an influence on Navy accessions and retentions. The raw data came from two 
sources, the NJROTC organization, Navy JROTC Unit Management System (JUMS) 
data, and Defense Management Data Center (DMDC). Chapter 3 described the 
methodology for answering the research questions. The data analysis and results for 
this dissertation was organized based on the four research questions. 
Data Analysis and Results Organized by Research Questions 
Research Question 1 
What are the NJROTC graduates' post high school career intentions by race, 
gender, location and socioeconomic status? 
The host schools are asked annually to provide the Naval Education Training 
Command (NETC) a variety of information on their graduating seniors. Figures and 
tabular data are offered in this section to provide noteworthy findings on NJROTC 
graduate intentions. The data for research question one was derived from the Navy 
JROTC Unit Management System database from the Department of the Navy (2006) 
and the 2000 United States census. 
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Figure 3 provides the number and percentage of education career intentions 
for NJROTC graduating cadets for the years 2001 through 2005. As seen in Figure 3, 
half of the NJROTC graduates plan to continue education after high school. The 
education options were four-year college, junior college, or technical or vocational 
school. The Total Other category consists of NJROTC graduates who were 
undecided, reported employment only, or did not provide a response. Of note, there 
was a seven percent rise in Total Education, 50 to 57 percent, from 2001 to 2005. 
Also evident was the decreasing trend of NJROTC graduates' intent on joining the 
military, decreasing from 40 to 36 percent from 2001 to 2005. Taken together with 



















Figure 3: Number and percentage of NJROTC graduates intent to pursue education, 
military or other 2001 - 2005 
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Figure 4 shows the number and percentage of military service branch 
intentions for NJROTC graduating cadets for the years 2001 through 2005. 
Approximately 36-41 percent of the NJROTC graduating cadets intended to join the 
Navy. What is also interesting is that from 2001 and 2005 between 28-34 percent of 
the NJROTC cadets intended to join the Army and over 20 percent intended on 
joining the Marine Corps. The Navy is definitely losing potential recruits to the Army 
and Marine Corps who are on record for targeting some of their recruiting efforts at 
JROTC units (Department of the Army, 1999; Dr. William McHenry, personal 



























* Air Force 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
1089 36% 1066 ; 38% '. 1145 : 40% : 1146 41% ; 1235 40% 
871 ; 28% ; 761 . 27% 694 : 25% 878 32% 1040 34% 
427 14% '. 385 14% : 326 12% 102 4% 116 4% 
Marino Corps 636 21% ; 577 20% • 626 ; 22% \ 606 22% 663 21% 
Coast Guard 34 1% 33 1% 39 1% 47 2% '-. 46 1% 
Figure 4: Number and percentage of NJROTC graduates' military service branch 
career intentions 2001 - 2005 
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Figure 5 depicts the number and percentage of the military program intentions 
for NJROTC graduating cadets for the years 2001 through 2005. From 2001 to 2005, 
of the NJROTC graduates who intended to pursue a military career, approximately 80 
percent intended to be enlisted personnel, while the resultant 20 percent intended to 
pursue officer programs: the Academy, Boost, ROTC scholarship, and ROTC non-
scholarship. The greater percentage pursuing enlisted careers suggests that NJROTC 
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Total Enlisted 2420 79% 2290 81% 2283 81% 2107 78% 2376 79% 
Figure 5: Number and percentage of NJROTC graduates' military program career 
intentions 2001 -2005 
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Figure 6 summarizes the number and percentage of the graduating senior 
cadets' intention to pursue employment (work full time) or undecided (did not know). 
As presented here above, from 2001 to 2005 there has been no significant change in 
the percentage of cadets that intended to seek employment only, approximately 6-8 
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100% 8157 100% 8S6G 100% 
Figure 6: Number and percentage of NJROTC graduates reporting employment or 
undecided as career intentions 2001 - 2005 
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Figure 7 illustrates the number and percentage of NJROTC graduating cadets 
by race for the years 2001 through 2005. White NJROTC cadets make up the largest 
percentage of NJROTC graduates. The percentage of White NJROTC graduates did 
not changed appreciably from 2001 to 2005, and included approximately 52 percent 
of the graduating cadets. Over the same period, Blacks have decreased from 26 to 22 
percent with Hispanics increasing from 14 to 18 percent. The percentage of Asian and 
Other minorities remained stable over the same time period. Figure 7 shows that 
NJROTC graduated a higher percentage of Blacks and Hispanics than the 
representative U.S. population average of 13 percent for each, with NJROTC 
graduating Black cadets (22 to 26 percent) and Hispanic cadets (14 to 18 percent). 
NJROTC graduates are also above the Navy enlisted strength percentage with DMDC 
reporting in 2004 that Blacks were at 20 percent and Hispanics were at nine percent. 
For officers DMDC reported even less representation with Black and Hispanic officer 
strength at nine and five percent respectively. These percentages show that NJROTC 
units would be an obvious minority recruiting source to meet the Navy's goal of 



























Figure 7: Number and percentage of NJROTCgraduates' race 2001 - 2005 
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Figure 8 provides the number and percentage of the gender for NJROTC 
graduating cadets for the years 2001 through 2005. From 2001 to 2005, 
approximately 60 percent of the NJROTC graduates were males and 40 percent were 
females. As of 2007, females made up 14 percent of the Navy enlisted force. 
NJROTC could provide the Navy an obvious recruiting tool for females. The 
information provided in Figures 7 and 8 is summarized in Table 6, which displays the 
number and percentage of gender and racial data for NJROTC graduating cadets for 











2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
I Male 4425 58.45% 4336 58.00% 4746 60.11% 4876 59.78% 5019 57.90% 
i Female 3146 41.55% 3049 42.00% 3149 39.89% 3281 40.22% 3650 42.10% 
Figure 8: Number and percentage of NJROTC graduates' gender 2001 - 2005 
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Table 6 
NJROTC Graduates Gender: Race: (2001 - 2005) - Crosstabulation 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 















































































































Total 3146 4425 7571 3049 4336 7385 3183 4780 7963 3281 4876 8157 3650 5019 8669 
41.6% 58.4% 100% 41.3% 58.7% 100% 40% 60% 100% 40.2% 59.8% 100% 42.1% 57.9% 100% 
Note. Distribution of NJROTC Graduates Intentions, 2001- 2005. From JROTC Unit Management System 
Database, by U.S. Department of the Navy, 2006. 
As shown, there were minimal gender fluctuations for the years 2001 and 2003-2005 
with Black females making up the largest percentage of Black graduating cadets. The 
range is 55 to 57 percent. White females ranged between 32 to 34 percent, Hispanic 
females between 44 to 47 percent, Asian females between 34 and 41 percent, and 
Other minority females 46 to 48 percent. However, in 2002 there were major gender 
fluctuations, 25-30 percent, with Blacks, Asians, Hispanics and Others. Again, this 
increase in minority gender representation over the actual population or even the 
percentage of females in the Navy (14%) make NJROTC an ideal female minority 
recruiting source. 
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Table 7 reveals the number and percentage of NJROTC graduating cadets by 
gender and education intention for the years 2001 through 2005. As seen here in 
Table 7, from 2001 to 2005, females ranged from 32 to 41 percent not pursuing post-
secondary education with males ranging from 47 to 67 percent. The intent to pursue 
four-year colleges had a decreasing trend for females from 2001 to 2003 with a high 
of 52 percent and a low of 27 percent of the NJROTC graduates with males having 
had an increasing trend of 47 to 67 percent. For gender comparisons between 2001 
and 2005, junior college intent and technical or vocational intent has had fluctuations, 
up and down of 10 percent. 
Table 7 
NJROTC Graduates Gender: Post Secondary Education Intentions (2001 - 2005) - Crosstabulation 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Female Male Total Female Male Total Female Male Total Female Male Total Female Male Total 
^Y,far 1139 1035 2174 1013 1380 2393 1027 2668 3695 1034 2468 3502 1133 2618 3751 
College 
52% 48% 100% 42% 58% 100% 28% 72% 100% 30% 71% 100% 30% 70% 100% 
J u " l o r 647 581 1228 509 666 1175 1387 1323 2710 1421 1498 2919 1653 1511 3164 
College 
53% 47% 100% 43% 57% 100% 51% 49% 100% 49% 51% 100% 52% 48% 100% 
T"ppnTiif*£ll ^t" 
. , 123 219 342 142 170 312 644 613 1257 697 685 1382 703 642 1345 
Vocational 
36% 64% 100% 45.5% 54.5% 100% 51.2% 48.8% 100% 50.4% 49.6% 100% 52.3% 47.7% 100% 
Other 1237 2590 3827 1385 2120 3505 125 176 301 129 225 354 161 248 409 
32.3% 67.7% 100% 39.5% 60.5% 100% 41.5% 58.5% 100% 36.5% 63.5% 100% 39.4% 60.6% 100% 
Total 3146 4425 7571 3049 4336 7385 3183 4780 7963 3281 4876 8157 3650 5019 8669 
41.6% 58.4% 100% 41.3% 58.7% 100% 40% 60% 100% 40.2% 59.8% 100% 42.1% 57.9% 100% 
Note. Distribution of NJROTC Graduates Intentions, 2001- 2005. From JROTC Unit Management System 
Database, by U.S. Department of the Navy, 2006. 
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Table 8 shows the number and percentage of the Geographic Area from which 
the NJROTC graduating cadets unit are located for the years 2001 through 2005. The 
locations of these areas were described in Figure 1 on page 18 of this dissertation. As 
seen in Table 8, the 11 NJROTC geographic areas had relatively the same percentage 
of NJROTC graduating cadets averaging from seven to 10 percent of the total. 
Analysis in each area by race and gender should be of interest to NJROTC Area 
Managers but was beyond the scope of this research. 
Table 8 
NJROTC Graduates: NJROTC Geographic Area (2001 - 2005) - Crosstabulation 




































































































































Note. Distribution of NJROTC Graduates Intentions, 2001- 2005. From JROTC Unit Management 
System Database, by U.S. Department of the Navy, 2006. 
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Figure 9 depicts the number and percentage of NJROTC graduates' 
socioeconomic status for the years 2001 through 2005. The socioeconomic status 
variable for an NJROTC graduate was derived from 2000 census data based on the 
NJROTC units' 5-digit Zip code. The four median income groups were divided into 
four categories as noted earlier: Low Income - 0 up to $43,601; Medium Low Income 
- $43,601 up to $53,026; Medium High Income - $53,026 up to $66,082; and High 
Income - $66,082 and greater. From 2001 to 2005 as displayed in Figure 9, the higher 
two income groups contain between 63 to 68 percent of the NJROTC graduates. One 
key observation from Figure 9 is that the higher two income groups had over 62 
percent of the NJROTC graduates. This helps counter those who perceive that the 
military and specifically the Navy primarily recruits those from lower socioeconomic 
statuses. 







































































I 37 .7% 
Figure 9: Number and Percentage of NJROTC Graduates by Socioeconomic Status 
for 2001 to 2005 
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Research Question 2 
Are there significant differences between NJROTC participants and non-NJROTC 
participants for Navy enlisted accessions by race, gender, AFQT score, location, and 
socioeconomic status? 
Data on Navy accessions were derived from the Defense Management Data 
Center (Appendix B). Differential analysis is offered in this section comparing 
NJROTC and non-NJROTC Navy accessions (Figures 10-14). Only the percent 
difference between NJROTC and non-NJROTC Navy accessions is offered in this 
section. The actual ratio of NJROTC to non-NJROTC naval accessions for 2001 to 
2005 was less than one percent of all Navy accessions. Though one may have issues 
with forecasting descriptive statistics based on NJROTC numbers being such a small 
percentage of the overall Navy accessions, the data are based on the population data 
of Navy accessions, which does offer support for its accuracy. As stated previously, 
the variable socioeconomic status, which had missing data, was tested to ensure the 
sample mean was not statistically different from the population mean. 
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Figure 10 shows the percentage difference between NJROTC and non-
NJROTC accessions by race for the years 2001 through 2005. Positive percentages in 
the figure represent the percent of NJROTC accessions for a given race category that 
is greater than non-NJROTC accessions, whereas negative percentages indicate the 
reverse. As seen here, there were eight percent more White non-NJROTC accessions 
in 2001 indicated by the trend line starting at minus eight percent. For Black 
accessions, there were eight percent more Black NJROTC accessions than non-
NJROTC accessions for 2001. The difference between both White and Black Navy 
accessions decreased until there was a zero percent difference in 2005. For Asians 

















































Figure 10: Percentage difference between NJROTC and non-NJROTC accessions by 
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Figure 11 shows the percentage difference of NJROTC and non-NJROTC 
accessions by gender for the years 2001 through 2005. When assessing the 
differences over the five year period, a higher percentage of females came from 
NJROTC accessions than non-NJROTC accessions, one to five percent, with a 
correspondingly lower percentage for males. This indicates that females with 
NJROTC participation are slightly more likely to join the Navy than non-NJROTC 
accessions with the reverse holding true for males. Not displayed in this dissertation 
but assessed in the analysis of the data was that Black females joined the Navy at a 14 
percent higher rate than non-NJROTC accessions: Whites females were 11 percent 
lower; Asian females were 3 percent lower; and Other females showed no difference. 
For males, Black NJROTC accessions were 5 percent higher, White males were 6 
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Figure 11: Percentage difference between NJROTC and non-NJROTC accessions by 














Figure 12 shows the percentage difference between NJROTC and non-
NJROTC accessions by AFQT score for the years 2001 through 2005. AFQT score is 
divided into six categories with Category I being the highest AFQT test score, 
ranging between 93 and 99, and Category V the lowest, one to nine. Of note, the two 
mid-range test score categories are Category IIIA and IIIB. For the Navy, Category 
IIIB test scores, 31 to 49, are considered the minimum acceptable test score to be a 
Navy recruit. Recruits with lower test scores must generally show other 
qualifications to be recruited by the Navy. Fewer than one percent of the Navy 
accessions have Category rv or V test scores. 
When assessing the differences in Figure 12, one can see that there is plus or 
minus three percent difference in AFQT scores when comparing NJROTC and non-
NJROTC accessions. For AFQT Category I, the highest AFQT score, the percentage 
of NJROTC accessions is less than the percentage of non-NJROTC accessions. In 
Category II, the percentage of NJROTC accessions is less than the percentage of non-
NJROTC accessions in all years except 2001. In Category IIIA, the first average 
rating for AFQT, the percentage of NJROTC accessions is the same in 2001 and 
greater from 2002 through 2005 than the non-NJROTC accessions. In Category IIIB, 
the second average category for AFQT scores, the percentage of NJROTC accessions 
compared to non-NJROTC accessions is greater for all years. For Category IV and V, 
there were few if any meaningful differences. 
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Figure 12: Percentage difference between NJROTC and non-NJROTC accessions by 
AFQT score from 2001 to 2005 
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Figure 13: Percentage difference between NJROTC and non-NJROTC 
accessions by U.S. region from 2001 to 2005. As shown in Figure 13, when 
comparing the differences of NJROTC accessions and non-NJROTC accessions by 
the above five regions, the most notable differences during this five-year period were 
in the Southeast and Midwest. At the extremes, the Southeast had approximately 27 
percent greater NJROTC accession rate, while the Midwest had a 16-19 percent fewer 
accessions than non-NJROTC accessions. In other regions, the Northeast non-
NJROTC accessions had an average of 10 percent greater accession rate over 
NJROTC accessions, whereas the West trend started out with a 10 percent greater 
accession rate in 2001 decreasing to almost zero in 2005. The Southwest had the 
reverse trend in comparison to the West, starting out with a 13 percent higher 






























- 1 % 


















- 1 % 
Figure 13: Percentage difference between NJROTC and non-NJROTC accessions by 
Region from 2001 to 2005 
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Figure 14: Percentage difference between NJROTC and non-NJROTC 
accessions by socioeconomic status from 2001 to 2005. See the definition of key 
terms in Chapter 1 for the actual income categories. As seen here, the differences of 
percentages between NJROTC and non-NJROTC of the three lower income groups 
fluctuated between plus or minus seven percent over the five-year period, where as 
the highest income group had a greater percentage from non-NJROTC accessions at 
six to 13 percent. Specifically, the lowest income group, in 2001 and 2002, had a 
higher percentage of NJROTC accessions, about six to seven percent. This trend 
changed for 2003 to 2005 where difference was between one and two percent. For the 
second lowest income group, there was about a three to five percent increase in 
NJROTC accessions over non-NJROTC accessions except in 2002 where there was 
no difference. In the second highest income group, there was no appreciable 
difference from 2001 to 2002 with NJROTC accession rates three to seven percent 
higher than non-NJROTC accessions from 2003 to 2005. In the highest income 









































Figure 14: Percentage difference between NJROTC and non-NJROTC accessions by 
socioeconomic status from 2001 to 2005 
Research Question 3: Are there significant differences between NJROTC participants 
and non-NJROTC participants for Navy enlisted retention by race, gender, AFQT 
score, location, and socioeconomic status? 
Data on Navy accessions were derived from the Defense Management Data 
Center. Included in this section are descriptive data and cross tabulations which 
helped guide the inferential examination of NJROTC and non-NJROTC accessions 
with respect to retention. The second section provides the binary logistic model with a 
summary of the results of the model. The descriptive data provided insight into the 
variables that later formed the logistic regression model. Specifically, the reference 
category (sometimes referred as the "omitted variable") of the predictor variables is 
identified for the model. The dependent variable in this analysis is the dichotomous 
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variable "retain," whether or not the Navy enlisted person was retained or not within 
the first three years of enlistment. The dichotomous predictor variables include 
Gender and NJROTC participation. The categorical variables are accession year, race, 
AFQT score, socioeconomic status, and U.S. Region. Before the binary logistic 
regression model is created, it is important to highlight any interactions between the 
dependent variable "retain" and the predictor variables. This is accomplished in the 
following Descriptive Statistics section using cross-tabulation data. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 9 provides the number and percentage of Navy enlisted personnel 
separated from the Navy within their first three years of enlistment. As seen in the 
table total accessions had decreased from 2001 to 2003 with the overall percentage of 
Navy accessions retained increasing from 73 to 76 percent. For chronological reasons 
the year 2001 is the reference category (omitted variable) for this model. 
Table 9 
Number and percentage of Navy accessions retained or separated 
within the first three years of enlistment: 2001 - 2003 
2001 2002 2003 Total 
Separated 13424 26.6% 10356 23.4% 9444 23.80% 33224 24.7% 
Retained 37097 73.4% 33820 76.6% 30159 76.20% 101076 75.3% 
50521 100.0% 44176 100.0% 39603 100.00% 134300 100.0% 
Note. Distribution of naval accessions for 2001- 2003. From Defense Management Data Center 
Database, by U.S. Department of Defense, 2006. 
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Table 10 displays the number and percentage of NJROTC and non-NJROTC 
accessions from 2001 to 2003. Noteworthy in this table was the relatively small 
percentage of NJROTC accessions, fewer than one percent. Although this number is 
small compared to all Navy accessions, it is still significant since it is the total 
population of Navy accessions that reported participating in NJROTC under the 
DMDC Youth Program Code. Non-NJROTC Navy accessions served as the 
reference category for this variable in the model. 
Table 10 
Number and percentage of NJROTC and non NJROTC Navy accessions: 2001-2003 
2001 2002 2003 Total 
NJROTC 365 0.7% 350 0.8% 306 0.8% 1021 0.8% 
Non NJROTC 50156 99.3% 43826 99.2% 39297 99.2% 133279 99.2% 
Total 50521 100.0% 44176 100.0% 39603 100.0% 134300 100.0% 
Note. Distribution of naval accessions for 2001- 2003. From Defense Management Data Center 
Database, by U.S. Department of Defense, 2006. 
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Table 11 shows the number and percentage of NJROTC graduates and non-
NJROTC accessions that were retained and separated from the Navy within three 
years of enlistment date of Fiscal Year 2001-2003. As described in the table, 
NJROTC Navy accessions between 2001 and 2003 retained at a five percent greater 
rate than non-NJROTC accessions. As stated previously, non-NJROTC accessions 
served as the reference category in the model. 
Table 11 
Number and percentage of Navy Accessions by NJROTC 

























Note. Distribution of naval accessions for 2001- 2003. From 
Defense Management Data Center Database, 
by U.S. Department of Defense, 2006. 
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Table 12 shows the number and percentage of Navy accessions by gender who 
were separated from or retained in the Navy within three years of enlistment date of 
Fiscal Year 2001-2003. In Table 12, Males were retained in the Navy at 
approximately two percent greater rates than female accessions. Further, from 2001 
to 2003, the Navy retained 84,096 males verses 16,980 females. Thus, males served 
as the reference category for the model. 
Table 12 
Number and percentage of Navy Accessions 
by gender separated or retained from 2001 to 2003 



















Note. Distribution of naval accessions for 2001- 2003. From 
Defense Management Data Center Database, 
by U.S. Department of Defense, 2006. 
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Table 13 shows the number and percentage of Navy accessions by race who 
were separated from or retained in the Navy within three years of enlistment date of 
Fiscal Year 2001-2003. There was no appreciable difference between White and 
Black Navy accessions with both having a 77 percent retention rate; Asians retained 
at an 85 percent rate with Other races retained at 64 percent. Since Whites make up 
the largest number of Navy accessions retained, White Navy accessions served as the 
reference category for the model. 
Table 13 
Number and percentage of Navy Accessions 
by race separated or retained from 2001 to 2003 




































Note. Distribution of naval accessions for 2001- 2003. 
From Defense Management Data Center Database, 
by U.S. Department of Defense, 2006. 
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Table 14 summarizes the number and percentage of Navy accessions by 
AFQT score who were separated from the Navy within three years of enlistment date 
of Fiscal Year 2001-2003. There were minimal differences with respect to retention 
between Category II, IIIA, IIIB and IV with accessions for all falling between 73 and 
78 percent retained. AFQT Category I had the greatest percentage retained over the 
three years of those that reported their scores with an 82 percent retention rate. The 
Unknown category, which represented those accessions who did not have a reported 
score, had the greatest retention rate with over 90.8 percent retention rate. Category 
IIIB had the greatest number of Navy accessions having 46,691 out of 134,300 and as 
such, served as the reference category for the model. 
Table 14 
Number and percentage of Navy accessions' Armed Forces Qualification 
Test score and Separted or Retained Crosstabulation: 2001 - 2003 
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Note. Distribution of naval accessions for 2001-2003. From Defense Management 
Data Center Database, by U.S. Department of Defense, 2006. 
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Table 15 gives the percentage of Navy accessions by U.S. Region that were 
retained or separated from the Navy within three years of enlistment of Fiscal Year 
2001-2003. In this table, there was little difference with respect to geographic 
location and Navy retention with all regions retaining between 73 and 78 percent. 
The No Zip category included accessions who either did not report their home of 
record or joined the Navy outside the United States. Since the Southeast had the 
greatest numbers of Navy accessions, 36,434 out of 134,300, it served as the 
reference category for the model. 
Table 15 
Number and percentage of Navy accessions from 5 US REGIONS 
and Separated or Retained Crosstabulation: 2001 - 2003 
Separated Retained Total 

















































Note. Distribution of naval accessions for 2001- 2003. From Defense Management 
Data Center Database, by U.S. Department of Defense, 2006. 
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Table 16 presents the number and percentage of Navy accessions by 
socioeconomic status who were retained or separated from the Navy within three 
years of enlistment of Fiscal Year 2001-2003. Since there were missing data (less 
than 1.7 percent of the data), the variables for both the sample and population were 
means tested. The results of the means test showed that there was no difference 
between the population and sample databases for the variables being analyzed (See 
appendix C). There is no meaningful difference based on socioeconomic status for 
Navy accessions with all four income categories having an about a 75 percent 
retention rate. The High income group is the reference category for the model having 
the greatest number of Navy accessions with 44,735 out of 132,061. 
Table 16 
Number and percentage of Navy accessions socioeconomic status 
and Separated or Retained Crosstabulation: 2001 - 2003 





































Note. Distribution of naval accessions for 2001- 2003. From Defense Management 
Data Center Database, by U.S. Department of Defense, 2006. 
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Reviewing the relevant descriptive statistics, the most likely Navy accession 
was a non-NJROTC White male in the High socioeconomic group from the Southeast 
with an AFQT category score of 3B. Based upon these data, these characteristics 
were the reference categories that made up the binary logistic regression model. 
Binary Logistic Regression Model 
The independent variable Separation Program Designation (SPD) was 
regrouped into a dichotomous variable with categories of Retained or Separated 
before completing three years of active service. Three years of service is considered 
the minimum time of enlistment. Even though some accessions were separated from 
the Navy for non-adverse reasons, they were still grouped with the accessions that did 
not meet the minimum contract of three years. The criterion variable for this research 
is dichotomous (retained in the Navy within three years of enlistment or not). Binary 
logistic regression analysis was used to model a Navy accession's retention prior to 
completing his or her first term of enlistment. The two dichotomous predictor 
variables used for this research are NJROTC participation and gender. The predictor 
variables that are categorical are race, AFQT scores, socioeconomic status, and 
region. The full list of variables included in the model along with a description of 
each variable is provided in Table 17. 
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Table 17 




Dichotomous Predictor Variables 
NJROTC REF 
Gender 
Categorical Predictor Variable 




MED INC REF HI 
LO INCOME 
MEDIUM LO INCOME 
MEDIUM HI INCOME 






AFQT REF 3B 
AFQT CAT 1 
AFQT CAT 2 
AFQT CAT 3A 
AFQT CAT 4 & 5 
AFQT UNK 
YEAR REF 2001 
YEAR 2002 
YEAR 2003 
Description and Coding 
0 if the Navy accession was separated , 1 if accession was retained 
0 if the Navy accession was a Non NJROTC accession, 1 for NJROTC accession 
0 if the Navy accession was a Male, 1 if the accession was a Female 
0 if the Navy accession's race was White - Reference Category 
1 if the Navy accession's race was Black 
Asian 
3 if the Navy accession's race was Other 
0 if the Navy accession's Medium Income group was from the Hi Income Group -
Reference Category 
1 if the Navy accession's Medium Income group was from the Lo Income Group 
2 if the Navy accession's Medium Income group was from the Medium Lo Income 
Group 
3 if the Navy accession's Medium Income group was from the Medium Hi Income 
Group 
0 if the Navy accession's region was from the Southeast 
1 if the Navy accession's region was from the West 
2 if the Navy accession's region was from the Southwest 
3 if the Navy accession's region was from the Midwest 
4 if the Navy accession's region was from the Northeast 
5 if the Navy accession's region was unknown 
0 if the Navy accession's AFQT category was 3B - Reference Category 
1 if the Navy accession's AFQT category was 1 
2 if the Navy accession's AFQT category was 2 
3 if the Navy accession's AFQT category was 3A 
4 if the Navy accession's AFQT category was 4 OR 5 
5 if the Navy accession's AFQT category was UNKNOWN 
0 if the Navy accession's year was 2001 - Reference Category 
1 if the Navy accession's year was 2002 
2 if the Navy accession's year was 2003 
Note. Distribution of naval accessions for 2001 - 2003. From Defense Management 
Data Center Database, by U.S. Department of Defense, 2001 - 2003. 
Model estimation was accomplished using two separate programs for binary 
regression models: binary logistic and probit. The probit model was not considered 
an optimum model based on the fact that the logit and probit model yield similar 
results for probabilities between .20 and .80. Further, the probit model does not offer 
the log odds information that is provided by the logit model. Therefore, the binary 
logistic, which offers several features to handle variable interaction effects, was used. 
Stepwise regression was also conducted in the exploratory phase for purposes of pure 
prediction. At the conclusion of the exploratory phase of conducting model runs, the 
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final model and the respective choice of variables was based on what made sense 
theoretically, as opposed to allowing the choice of the model based solely on a 
computer algorithm. This is supported by Menard who claims, "there appears to be 
general agreement that the use of computer-controlled stepwise procedures to select 
variables is inappropriate for theory testing because it capitalizes on random 
variations in the data and produces results that tend to be idiosyncratic and difficult to 
replicate in any sample other than the sample in which they were originally obtained" 
(p.54, 2002). Based on this theoretical model selection, an explanation of the results 
for the logistic regression model follows. 
The first graphic displayed in the analysis was the Case Processing Summary 
in Table 18 that provided the number of Navy accessions being analyzed. For this 
study, all accessions from 2001 to 2003 were included except for 2,239 cases. It is 
important to take a moment to discuss these missing cases, which were maintained in 
the limitation section of the methods chapter. These cases were excluded based on 
having no socioeconomic status data. The reason for that was the socioeconomic 
status variable was based on the home of record Zip code the Navy accessions 
reported in enlistment documents. Since the number was 2,239 out of 134,300, less 
than 1.7 percent of the cases, it was not considered a major problem to exclude these 
cases from the model based on the means test that was mentioned earlier. 
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Table 18 
Case Processing Summary 
N Percent 
Selected Cases Included in Analysis 132061 98.3 
Missing Cases 2239 \1_ 
Total 134300 100 
Unselected Cases 0 0 
Total 134300 100 
Note. Distribution of naval accessions for 2001- 2003. From Defense Management 
Data Center Database, by U.S. Department of Defense, 2006. 
Included in the binary logistic regression output are such goodness-of-fit 
measures as the model chi-squares, log likelihood, pseudo measures of R square using 
the Cox and Snell and the Nagelkerke test, and the Hosmer and Lemshow test, which 
are described next. Results of the logistic analysis indicated in Table 19 by the model 
chi-squares provides a statistically significant improvement over the constant only 
model, X2 (20, N- 132,061) = 3460.53. This clearly suggests that the independent 
variables improve the prediction of the outcome. 
Table 19 
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 1 Step 3460.53 20 0 
Block 3460.53 20 0 
Model 3460.53 20 0 
Note. Distribution of naval accessions for 2001- 2003. From Defense Management 
Data Center Database, by U.S. Department of Defense, 2006. 
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The Model Summary table, shown in Table 20, presents three measures of how 
well the logistic regression model fits the data. The -2 Log likelihood statistic is 
144365.63. For this particular logit model, one must look at the likelihood ratio chi-
square. That measure is defined as 2(Li - L0), where Lo represents the log likelihood 
for the "constant only" model, and L] is the log likelihood for the full model with 
constant and predictors. This is the probability of obtaining this chi-square statistic 
(144365.63) if there is in fact no effect of the independent variables, taken together, 
on the dependent variable. This statistic normally has little value except for 
comparing different logistic models. The Cox & Snell R Square (.03) and Nagelkerke 
(.04) are pseudo R measures. These two pseudo R squared tests were used to 
determine the percentage of variance in the dependent variable explained by the 
independent variable in logistic regression and are analogous to R" generated in 
multiple regression analysis. Based on these R measures, the model only explained 
three or four percent of the variation of Navy retention. 
Table 20 
Model Summary 
-2 Log likelihood Cox & Snell R Square Nagelkerke R Square 
144365.63 0.03 0.04 
Note. Distribution of naval accessions for 2001- 2003. From Defense Management 
Data Center Database, by U.S. Department of Defense, 2006. 
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The Hosmer and Lemeshow Test in Table 21 provided a formal test assessing 
whether the predicted probabilities match the observed probabilities. In this research, 
the goodness-of-fit statistic is 86.62, and is associated with a p value of .00, indicating 
a close match between the predicted and observed probabilities. 
Table 21 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
Chi-square df Sig. 
86.62 8 0.00 
Note. Distribution of naval accessions for 2001-2003. From Defense Management 
Data Center Database, by U.S. Department of Defense, 2006. 
Prediction success for the cases listed in the model was 75.2 percent. This 
percentage is based on the number retained, 99,362, divided by the total number of 
Navy accessions in the model 132,061. Based on the descriptive statistics of the 
predictor variables the most likely Navy accession was a non-NJROTC white male 
from the Southeast with an AFQT category 3B from the Medium High 
socioeconomic status. These along with the accession year of 2001 were the reference 
categories used in the model. 
Taken together, the results of the various exploratory analyses yielded the 
final binary logistic regression model: 
Ln((Pr Retain)/l-Pr(Total Accession)) = B0+ B,(NJROTC) + B2(GENDER) + B3(BLACK) + 
+B4(ASIAN) + B5(OTHER) + B6(LO INCOME) + B7(MED LO INCOME)+ B8(MED HI 
INCOME) +B9(WEST) + B10(SOUTHWEST) +B„(MIDWEST) + B12(NORTHEAST) + 
Bl3(OTHER) + BI4(AFQT 1) + B,5(AFQT 2) + B16(AFQT 3B) + B17(AFQT 4) + BI8(AFQT 
UNK) + B19(2002) + B20(2003) 
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Table 22 displays the regression coefficients (B), the Standard Error (S.E.), 
the Wald statistics, significance level, odds ratio [Exp (B)], and the 95% confidence 
intervals (CI) for odds ratios (OR) for each of the predictors. The logistic regression 
coefficients reveal the amount of change in the log odds when there is a one-unit 
change in the predictor variable holding all other variables constant. A coefficient 
close to zero implies that there is no change due to that predictor variable. It is 
important to note that regression coefficients (B) do not tell us as much about the 
variable's importance for the research than the exponentiated coefficients [Exp (B)] 
with their respective confidence intervals. It is these odds ratios that are the center of 
the discussion on the extent to which the predictor variables impact the dependent 
variable retention. The confidence intervals are also important in that the relatively 
small confidence intervals for all the predictor variables suggest an acceptable level 
of precision in the model's predictor variables. The Wald test reports that all the 
predictor variables were statistically significant predictors of retaining naval 
accessions (except for MIDWEST, AFQT 3A and AFQT 4&5). This test is analogous 
to the "t" test in multiple regression. 
As stated previously, the results of the Exp (B) column, the odds ratio, and 
their respective confidence intervals provided the most meaningful data from the 
model data listed in Table 22 and is the highlight of the next discussion. 
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Table 22 
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Note. Distribution of naval accessions for 2001- 2003. From Defense Management 
Data Center Database, by U.S. Department of Defense, 2006. 
When assessing the odds ratio in column Exp (B), Navy accessions with 
NJROTC participation were 45 percent more likely to retain in the Navy for their first 
three years of enlistment than non-NJROTC accessions, adjusting for gender, race, 
region, AFQT score, socioeconomic status, and year of accession. One can also see 
that at the 95 percent confidence interval, the lower limit was 1.24 and the upper limit 
was 1.70, which equates to a 24 to 70 percent probability that NJROTC accessions 
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were more likely to retain than non-NJROTC accessions. Thus, the influence of 
NJROTC, which was the basis of this research, was found to have a positive effect on 
naval accessions retaining in the Navy for their first term of enlistment. The next step 
focuses on discussing the interaction affects of the other predictor variables. 
Gender was significant when holding all other variables constant. Females had 
a six percent decrease in the odds of retaining when compared to males holding all 
other variables in the model constant. 
For Race, all categories when referenced to White Navy accessions were 
significant. The Black Navy accession had a 10 percent increase in the odds of 
retaining when compared to the White Navy accession holding all other variables in 
the model constant. The Asian Navy accession had a 59 percent increase in the odds 
of retaining holding all other variables in the model constant; and the unknown Navy 
accession, which most likely contains large proportion of Hispanics, had a 50 percent 
decrease in the odds of retaining when compared to White Navy accessions holding 
all other variables in the model constant. 
For socioeconomic status, all categories of income when referenced to the 
High income group were significant. The Low income group had a 12 percent 
increase in the odds of retaining when compared to the High income group holding all 
other variables in the model constant. The Low Medium income group had a six 
percent increase in the odds holding all other variables in the model constant; and the 
High Medium income group had a five percent increase in the odds holding all other 
variables in the model constant. 
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For Region, all regions when referenced to the Southeast were significant 
except for the Midwest with a reported significance value of .74. It is important to 
note that this predictor variable does not have a meaningful difference from the 
reference variable. This can be also seen from the reported confidence interval with 
the lower limit of .97 and the upper limit reported as 1.01, indicating an odds ratio 
close to one to one resulting in a failure to reject the null hypothesis for this particular 
variable. The West had a 45 percent increase in the odds of retaining when compared 
to the Southeast holding all other variables in the model constant. The Southwest had 
a 22 percent increase in the odds of retaining holding all other variables in the model 
constant; the Northeast had a 17 percent increase in the odds of retaining holding all 
other variables in the model constant; and those that did not report a Zip code had a 
176 percent increase in the odds holding all other variables in the model constant. 
For enlisted qualification test scores using AFQT categories compared to the 
reference AFQT Category 3B, all variables were significant except AFQT Category 
3A and 4, with their respective significance values at .73 and .33. The AFQT 
Category 1 had a 66 percent increase in the odds of retaining holding all other 
variables in the model constant; the AFQT Category 2 had a 28 percent increase in 
the odds of retaining holding all other variables in the model constant; and those that 
had missing AFQT score had a 252 percent increase in the odds holding all other 
variables in the model constant. 
For Accession Year, all categories of the year of Navy accessions when 
referenced to 2001 were significant. The accessions from 2002 had a 18 percent 
increase in the odd of being retained when compared to 2001 accessions holding all 
100 
other variables constant. The 2002 accessions had a 19 percent increase in the odds of 
being retained when compared to the 2001 Navy accessions holding all other 
variables constant. 
Research Question 4 
Is there a significant difference between NJROTC graduate cadets' intent to enlist in 
the Navy and their actual behavior by race, gender, and location? 
The Navy JUMS database, which contains the NJROTC graduate intent data, 
was compared to the DMDC database containing the actual accessions data. When 
the actual data were compared, the results showed that over a three-year period only 
40 percent of those who intended on enlisting in the Navy per the JUMS data were 
recorded as enlisting per the DMDC data. These low percentages prevented drawing a 
reasonable link between the JUMS and the DMDC database and thus conducting 
further analysis. Given the fact that social security numbers were unavailable from 
NJROTC Unit for Privacy Act reasons cited by the NETC, there was no way to track 
an NJROTC graduate's intentions from the JUMS database with actual DMDC 
accessions data. 
The anomaly that the percentages were so far apart is most likely due to 
several reasons. First of all, the DMDC database tracks only JROTC accessions who 
report have three or four years of JROTC, which excludes accessions with one or two 
years. Secondly, some of the NJROTC who stated they intended to enlist may not 
have enlisted. Finally, some of the NJROTC graduates may have changed their 
desired branch of enlistment and enlisted in another service. Because of this disparity 
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in data, further analysis of these data was considered too imprecise and, as a result, 
this research question will not be addressed further. 
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CHAPTER 5 
FINDINGS, POLICY IMPLICATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
FURTHER RESEARCH 
The current literature shows the positive impact of the Junior Reserve Officer 
Training Corps participation on the values and educational performance of 
participants (Hawkins, 1988, Roberts, 1991; Bailey et al, 1992; Perruse, 1997; CSIS, 
1999; Logan, 2000; Hicks, 2000; Demoulin & Ritter, 2000; Bulach, 2002; Morris, 
2003; Marks, 2004). However, several articles were also reviewed that argued for 
JROTC's removal from high school campuses based on the belief that military 
recruiting efforts should not be represented on high school campuses (Berlowitz, 
2000; Ayers, 2006; Barbassa, 2008; Johnson, 2008). More importantly, it should be 
noted that most of the JROTC literature is based on small-scale survey research and 
anecdotal evidence, with both sides of the controversy providing little quantifiable 
evidence on the return on investment of the program for the U.S. military. 
Limited research from the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) using Defense 
Management Data Center (DMDC) accessions data does provide empirical evidence 
suggesting that JROTC participation has a positive impact on military accessions and 
retentions (Laurence & Estrada, 2003; Walls, 2003; Days & Ang, 2004; Hentz & 
Packwood, 2007). While NPS research provides quantifiable evidence for all of 
JROTC, there is a paucity of empirical evidence on Navy JROTC; however, the 
results of the research reported in this dissertation provide empirical evidence on the 
positive correlation between NJROTC participation and Navy accessions and 
retentions. 
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The purpose of this study was to conduct an empirical analysis of NJROTC 
graduate intent data and Navy accessions data to determine the impact NJROTC 
participation has on Navy accessions and retentions. As described earlier, the 
methodology for the study was a quantitative analysis of pre-existing data. The data 
received from the Navy JROTC Unit Management System (JUMS) consisted of five 
databases from 2001 to 2005 with NJROTC intent data on approximately 8,000 
records per year. Navy enlisted accessions data that were received from DMDC also 
contained five databases from the fiscal years 2001 to 2005 with approximately 
40,000 records in each. As mentioned in the methodology chapter, selection bias was 
considered and deemed not a factor considering the data analyzed were the population 
data of NJROTC graduates and Navy accessions. 
The following research questions were addressed in this dissertation: (1) What 
are the NJROTC graduates' post-high school career intentions by race, 
gender, location, and socioeconomic status? (2) Are there significant differences 
between NJROTC participants and non-NJROTC participants for Navy enlisted 
accessions by race, gender, AFQT score, location, and socioeconomic status? (3) 
Are there significant differences between NJROTC participants and non-NJROTC 
participants for Navy enlisted retention by race, gender, AFQT score, location, and 
socioeconomic status? (4) Is there a significant difference between NJROTC 
graduate cadets' intent to enlist in the Navy and their actual behavior by race, gender, 
and location? An attempt at linking the JUMS and DMDC data as guided by Research 
Question 4, and as discussed in Chapter 4, showed that the linkage was too imprecise 
and deemed impractical for further analysis. 
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Summary of Findings 
Analyzing the Navy JROTC Unit Management System (JUMS) on NJROTC 
graduate intent data provided the following descriptive statistics to answer Research 
Question 1. 
From 2001 to 2005, 52 percent of more than 40,000 NJROTC graduates 
intended on pursuing four-year college, junior college, or technical/vocation schools. 
In the same period, seven percent chose full-time employment with five percent 
undecided or marking "other." The remaining NJROTC graduates, 36 percent, 
intended on pursuing a military career as an officer or enlisted person. This high 
percentage of NJROTC students pursuing the military was supported by the literature, 
which reported JROTC students are five times more likely to join the military than 
non-JROTC students (Laurence & Estrada, 2003). As expected, the Navy had the 
greatest percentage of NJROTC cadets who intended on joining the military with 39 
percent. Next, the Army had 29 percent; the Marine Corps had 21 percent; and the 
Air Force had the figure at 11 percent. 
From 2001 to 2005, the NJROTC graduates were 52 percent White, 24 percent 
Black, 16 percent Hispanic, five percent Asian, and three percent Other. The 
percentage of NJROTC graduates for Black and Hispanics is above the U.S. 
population average, which is 13 percent for both groups. In addition, this is also 
above the U.S. Navy average of 15 percent for Blacks and nine percent for Hispanic 
personnel as reported in 2004 by the DMDC. These findings were also voiced by 
other NPS studies that cite JROTC as a good recruiting source for minority groups 
(Laurence & Estrada, 2003; Days & Ang, 2004). As a result, this makes NJROTC an 
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attractive resource for Navy recruiters who are trying to achieve the Chief of Naval 
Operation's goal of a Navy that represents the changing face of America (Admiral 
Michael Mullen, personal communication, September 22, 2005; Admiral Gary 
Roughhead, personal communication, March 3, 2008). 
NJROTC female participants' intent to join the Navy remained stable from 
2001 to 2005 at approximately 40 percent. Though 40 percent is below the female 
representation in the American workforce of 46 percent, it is well above the 15 
percent Navy female representation, making NJROTC an appealing resource to 
recruit females. Noteworthy is the percentage of female Blacks and Hispanics whose 
intent to join the Navy from 2003 to 2005 averaged 56 and 45 percent respectively. 
This parallels findings in the literature by Laurence and Estrada who found similar 
percentages (2003). 
Using the socioeconomic status variable, NJROTC graduates were found to be 
from higher income groups than non-NJROTC accessions. This may or may not be 
of significance to the Navy with respect to recruiting, but it is a data point dispelling 
the myth that the military, including NJROTC, recruits primarily from those at lower 
socioeconomic status levels (Berlowitz, 2000). 
Next, using the Defense Management Data Center (DMDC) database, 
NJROTC participants and non-NJROTC participants were compared from 2001 to 
2005 to answer Research Question 2. 
When NJROTC and non-NJROTC accessions were compared by race, Black 
NJROTC accessions showed a seven percent increase over Black non-NJROTC 
accessions from 2001 to 2003, decreasing to 2.9 percent in 2004 and then to no 
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difference in 2005. This decreasing trend for Black accessions contradicts similar 
research that showed Black JROTC accessions having a five to seven percent higher 
accessions rate from 1990 to 2001 than their non-JROTC counterpart (Laurence & 
Estrada, 2003). Asians and Other (includes Hispanics) race categories showed similar 
trends with Whites showing no appreciable difference from 2001 to 2005. 
The female NJROTC accessions had a slightly greater percentage than their 
non-NJROTC accessions counterparts. From 2001 to 2005, NJROTC female 
accessions had a 5.5 percent greater differential in 2005, decreasing to one percent in 
2003 and then increasing to 4.4 percent in 2005. This supports previous research 
expressing that female JROTC accessions are more likely to join the military than 
non-JROTC female accessions (Laurence and Estrada, 2003). Moreover, during the 
same five-year period, Black female NJROTC accessions had the greatest difference 
with a 14 percent greater accession rate into the Navy than their non-NJROTC 
accession counterparts. For males, over the same period, Black NJROTC accessions 
showed a five percent higher accession rate than non-NJROTC accessions while 
White males showed the opposite. It is important to note that in 2005 the difference 
for both Black females and males between NJROTC and non-NJROTC accessions 
decreased to zero. This decrease has been highlighted in news reports based on the 
disapproval of the war in Iraq by Blacks (Philpott, 2007). 
When assessing qualification for enlistment using Armed Force Qualification 
Test (AFQT) scores, the findings indicated that non-NJROTC accessions had a 
slightly greater percentage from the higher two AFQT scores (Category I and II), 
averaging about two percent greater over the five-year period. The middle two scores 
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(Category IIIA and B), averaged three percent greater for NJROTC accessions. 
Though not a dramatic difference, it supports the Laurence and Estrada study which 
also reported similar results for JROTC and non-JROTC accessions. The lower two 
AFQT scores (Category IV and V) showed no appreciable difference. 
When assessing location for the five U.S. regions, all showed a stable trend 
with the Southeast averaging almost 30 percent greater NJROTC Navy accessions 
over the five-year period studied. The Southwest showed a decreasing trend for 
NJROTC accessions averaging five percent greater than non-NJROTC accessions. 
The remaining regions had a greater percentage of non-NJROTC accessions, with 
Midwest averaging 17 percent greater, and the Northeast averaging 11 percent greater 
from 2001 to 2005. Navy accessions reporting the category Other showed no 
difference. It appears that these regional results are reported in this present study for 
the first time in the existing JROTC literature. 
The socioeconomic status data showed NJROTC accessions had a greater 
percentage from the Low, Medium Low, and Medium High income groups whereas 
non-NJROTC accessions showed about a nine percent greater difference in the High 
income group. This in itself could suggest that the military is a more attractive 
opportunity for NJROTC accessions than non-NJROTC accessions at the lower three 
income groups. Since the accessions were enlisted accessions only, perhaps NJROTC 
graduating cadets in the higher income group pursued a career as an officer, which 
was not tracked by the DMDC data. 
The above findings suggest rejecting the hypothesis offered in the 
methodology chapter - Among Navy enlisted accessions, there is no significant 
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difference between those who participated in NJROTC and those who did not. 
NJROTC participation showed significant differences on Navy accessions with Black 
females, recruits from the Southeast, and recruits from the lower three socioeconomic 
status groups. Other NPS studies substantiate that there was a positive association 
between JROTC participation and military accessions (Laurence & Estrada, 2003; 
Days & Ang, 2004). 
The DMDC database from fiscal year 2001 to 2003 was also used to answer 
Research Question 3. 
For apparently the first time in the Navy JROTC literature it is believed, a 
logistic regression model was created using Navy retention as the dependent variable 
and NJROTC participation as the primary predictor variable to determine the 
association NJROTC has on Navy retention. Also assessed were the interactions of 
other variables on Navy retention. The findings support previous JROTC studies by 
NPS suggesting that JROTC participation has a strong positive association on 
military retention (Hentz, 2007; Laurence & Estrada, 2003; Days & Ang, 2004). The 
noteworthy finding based on the logistic regression model was that NJROTC 
accessions are 45 percent more likely to retain in their first term of enlistment over 
non-NJROTC participants after holding all the other variables in the model constant. 
The results from this model suggest that the hypothesis that among Navy enlisted who 
are retained in the Navy, there is no significant difference between those who 
participated in NJROTC and non-NJROTC accessions should be rejected. 
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Policy-Making Implications 
This study has policy-making implications for the Navy, local school districts, 
and anti-JROTC organizations. These organizations will be the focus of the 
discussion. 
Implications for Navy Policy-Making 
As mentioned, a high percentage of NJROTC graduates intended on joining 
the Army and Marine Corps. It was also found that the Army and Marine Corps 
actively recruit the service JROTC units, whereas the Navy does not. The Navy 
continues to maintain that the NJROTC program is not a recruiting tool. In spite of 
this, Navy leaders in the Navy Recruiting Command and NJROTC Headquarters 
could replicate this research to compare the benefits of recruiting from this period of 
analysis, 2001 to 2005, to that of the future. At the same time, the Navy can continue 
to justify NJROTC accessions as only a side recruiting benefit based on the 
comparably small numbers of NJROTC graduating cadets, which continues to 
represent less than two percent of those who plan to enter the Navy as enlisted 
personnel or officers. Moreover, Navy leaders can also state that this unintended 
recruiting benefit from NJROTC could be because NJROTC cadets had preselected to 
join the military before NJROTC had any influence on their decision to join the Navy 
(Days & Ang, 2004). 
Overall the policy implications of this research suggests that the Navy could 
justify continued funding of NJROTC based on graduating cadets intention to join the 
Navy, access to minorities, females, and the savings associated with retention. Yet, 
even with these potential benefits, one cannot deny that justifying NJROTC for its 
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recruiting benefits could also result in a major policy failure in that it could be the 
impetus that causes viable NJROTC Units to close. Thus, with this in mind, it may 
behoove the Navy leadership to continue to stress the citizenship-training objective 
over the collateral recruiting benefits. On the other hand, with 198 schools on the 
NJROTC waiting list and the Army and Marine Corps actively recruiting at NJROTC 
Units, it may be time to add recruiting JROTC students as a goal for NJROTC and the 
Navy Recruiting Command. 
Implications for Local School District Policy-Making 
While local school district leaders are generally pleased at having a JROTC 
unit that stresses citizenship and leadership, they continue to face criticism for having 
the military on high school campuses. The policy implication this research has on 
local school districts is that it could provide empirical evidence of the recruiting 
benefits for NJROTC to those who argue against JROTC on high school campuses. 
Evidence that suggests recruiting is more than an unintended benefit to the Navy, or 
to the military in general, with dwindling school budgets could tip the scales in favor 
of those that argue against JROTC. 
Implications for Anti-JROTC Organizations Policy-Making 
In the literature review, organizations that take an anti-JROTC stance were 
discussed. This research provides added evidence that could be used by these 
organizations to show there is quantifiable evidence that NJROTC units are 
benefiting the Navy in its recruitment efforts, unintended or not. Empirical evidence 
that NJROTC offers the Navy recruitment benefits coupled with existing Navy policy 
to provide special incentive considerations into officer entry programs and 
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entitlements for advanced promotion upon enlistment make it difficult to argue that 
NJROTC is not a recruiting program. 
Recommendations for Future Research 
With 198 high schools on the waiting list to have a NJROTC Unit on their 
campus, cost benefit analyses should be conducted by the four JROTC service 
programs to determine what the proper service mix should be for adding JROTC 
units. One important data point to be included in a cost benefit analysis to support 
increasing NJROTC units is the cost savings associated with not having to discharge 
a recruit early. The model in this research suggests that 45 percent of NJROTC Navy 
accessions are more likely to be retained during their first term of enlistment over 
their non-NJROTC counterpart. This, taken together with the direct costs to train an 
NJROTC cadet, $5000, verses recruiting a non-NJROTC accession, $11,000, could 
be modeled to determine whether Navy funds should be transferred from the Navy 
Recruiting Command to NJROTC. Previous research on all the service JROTC 
programs reports that the military could save almost $42 million annually. These 
savings are primarily based on DOD estimates to recruit, train, and retain a military 
accession (Laurence & Estrada, 2003). 
A warning is offered in advance for those who may pursue cost benefit 
analysis to support adding JROTC units as a recruiting tool. Cost benefit analysis has 
been criticized for being a rational decision tool that is not suited to handle complex 
social problems as well as providing non-normative solutions to normative social 
problems (Patton, 1993). If this type of analysis were to be conducted, it would be 
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important to conduct an added risk mitigation analysis based on recruiting being 
added to the JROTC mission statement. 
Since this research suggests that NJROTC should be considered as a 
recruiting tool, a question worth asking is what would happen if the Navy changed its 
stance by declaring NJROTC was also to be used as a recruiting tool. Answering this 
question could be an ideal research project using survey instruments. The target of the 
survey should be a strategic sampling of principals or stakeholders at high schools 
with NJROTC units. In answering this question, one could forecast that certain units 
would close if recruiting were to be added to the mission statement. Given the 
likelihood that certain units may close and until further policy analysis is conducted, 
Navy leaders should remain status quo with their stance that NJROTC is a citizenship 
and leadership program. This is supported by the controversy in San Francisco where 
the school board voted to close all JROTC units citing unequal treatment based on the 
military's "Don't ask, don't tell" policy and the belief that JROTC is a military 
recruiting tool (Barbassa, 2008). A recent non-binding ballot measure in November, 
2008 supported retaining JROTC in San Francisco, though this vote does not mean 
that JROTC will be retained (Johnson, 2008). 
This study suggests that NJROTC participation is a good recruiting source for 
under-represented minorities while showing empirical evidence that there is a strong 
positive association with NJROTC participation and first term Navy retention. As far 
as implications for continuing research, this dissertation's methodology can be used 
annually to quantify the impact NJROTC has on accessions and retentions. 
Additionally, it is recommended that research be conducted into why Black NJROTC 
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accessions have decreased from seven percent greater than non-NJROTC accessions 
to zero between 2001 to 2005. Recent reports from DMDC showed that all services 
had declines in Black enlistment from 2002 - 2006. Sentiments from the Black 
community, as mentioned earlier, indicate the reason behind the drop in Black 
enlistments is based on the Black communities' disapproval of the war in Iraq 
(Philpott, 2007). 
While the NJROTC program not only teaches high school students leadership 
and citizenship as defined in the NJROTC mission statement, it also instructs them 
about life in the Navy and Marine Corps. This, anecdotally, suggests that NJROTC 
could be used as a pipeline-training tool in that NJROTC fulfils the role of a Navy 
orientation program. Further research may be warranted on the savings realized by 
decreasing recruit training time for NJROTC graduates. 
Based on research question four of this research, 40 percent of NJROTC 
graduates who intended to enlist per the JUMS database actually enlisted per the 
DMDC database. This discrepancy was found when attempting to link NJROTC 
intention from the JUMS database and the actual accession data from the DMDC 
database. To address this discrepancy further research is warranted into why the 
Navy JUMS database does not match the DMDC accession data. As mentioned 
earlier in this dissertation this could be easily resolved if social security information 
was available on NJROTC graduates. However, due to Privacy Act reasons Social 
Security numbers were not available for this research. 
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The final research recommendation is to have the other services replicate this 
research to determine the impact their JROTC programs have on accessions and 
retentions. 
Conclusion 
The analysis of the Navy JROTC Unit Management System and Defense 
Management Data Center data adds quantitative evidence of NJROTC graduate intent 
data and Navy accessions and retentions data that do not exist in the current JROTC 
literature. The findings indicate that NJROTC is good recruiting source for Navy 
accessions and that NJROTC has positive influence on Navy retentions. It is the 
conclusion of this research, that since 1964, the Navy JROTC program continues to 
provide a worthy benefit of citizenship and leadership training to high school students 
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NAVY JROTC UNIT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (JUMS) 
DATA 
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Navy JROTC Unit Management System (JUMS) Data 
The JUMS database includes variables that record NJROTC graduate career intent 
data. NJROTC program managers (Pensacola, Florida) maintain the database. Each 
NJROTC Unit collects career intent data annually on graduating seniors and records them 
into the JUMS database. The JUMS database also provides NTSC with up-to-date 
information on student enrollment demographics and financial accounting of the unit 
expenses. The JUMs data have been recorded since 1994, but they have only been in a 
computer accessible database since 2000. Thus, the 6 years obtained for this study range 
from 2000 to 2005. The relevant data for this study on graduating career intent include 
the following: 
1. Race (Black, White, Hispanic, Asian and Other) 
2. Location of Unit (NJROTC Geographic Area) 
3. Gender 
4. Post High School Career Intention Variables 
a. Enlisted by service 
b. Officer entry programs by service 
c. Two-year college 







DEFENSE MANAGEMENT DATA CENTER (DMDC) 
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Defense Data Management Center (DMDC) Data 
The DMDC is divided into five main sections: (a) Databases/Files, (b) Operational 
Programs, (c) Data Delivery Systems, (d) Published Reports, and (e) Historical/Files. 
The data for my research were drawn from the enlisted accession's database. The 
population data for this study were Navy enlisted accessions divided into five cohort files 
between Fiscal Year 2001 and 2005. One of the key identifiers in the cohort files is 
"Youth Program," in which NJROTC cadets are categorized as one of the variables. 
Each cohort file contains 65 variables. The following variables were analyzed to 
determine whether there are any significant differences among NJROTC cadets, other 
service JROTC cadets, and non-JROTC students: 
1. Social Security number (scrambled to ensure anonymity) 
2. Accession date 
3. Separation date 
4. Separation code (reason for separation) 
5. Location of enlistment (Zip code and State) 
6. Race (Black, White, Asian, Other) 
7. Ethnic (divided into 20 variables of interest) 
8. Youth Program (JROTC, Sea Cadet, ROTC, and Cadet Air Patrol) 
9. Mental Group (based on Armed Force Qualification Test (AFQT) scores). 
AFQT is designed to measure the trainability of potential recruits. The categories 
are sub-divided into percentiles based on a potential recruit's score on the test: 
CAT I: 93 to 99%; CAT II: 65 to 92%; CAT IIIA: 50 to 64%; CAT IIIB: 31 to 
49%; CAT IV: 10 to 30%; and CAT V: 1 to 9%. 
APPENDIX C 
MEANS TESTING OF SAMPLE DATA 
MEANS TESTING OF SAMPLE DATA 
1. The tables below represent the means for the population and sample data for Zip 
codes that had missing Median Income data. The independent variable is Median 
Income, and the predictor variables are RACE, NJROTC, SPD SEPARATED OR 
NOT, GENDER, 5 US REGIONS, and AFQT NEW. Table CI the population data 
and Table C2 is the sample data. The purpose of this means test is to determine 
whether the missing data median income data for 2,239 Navy accessions has a 
significant impact on the six-predictor variables that will be used in the logistic 
regression model for Research Question 3. 
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2. The means for our six variables, RACE, NJROTC, SPD SEPARATED OR NOT, 
GENDER, 5 US REGIONS, and AFQT NEW between Table CI and C2 are the same 
except for the 5 US REGIONS, which has a difference of .01. The means test of this 
variable is below, which resulted in concluding that the sample mean of this variable 
was not different from the population mean. 
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a. Hypothesis: 
• The Null Hypothesis: The population mean is 3.01 
• The Alternate Hypothesis: The sample mean is not 3.01 
b. Level of significance is .01 
c. Test statistic Z test - the value nearest to.4950 is 2.58 
d. Decision rule - Do not reject the null hypothesis if Z falls between -2.58 
and 2.58. Reject the null hypothesis if Z falls outside of-2.58 or 2.58. 
e. z = Sample Mean - Population Mean / Standard Deviation of population / 
the square root of the sample population: 
z = -2.57001 
f. Because -2.57 does not fall within the rejection region (< -2.58 and > 
2.58) the null hypothesis is not rejected and we can conclude that the 
sample mean is not different from the population mean. 
Given that the other means: RACE; NJROTC; GENDER; and SPD (Separation 
Program Designation) SEPARATED OF NOT, and AFQTNEW are the same, one 
can conclude that the missing data in the Median Income variable has no significant 
impact on the variables used in the logistic regression model for Research Question 3. 
